

JPRS-USA-88-007
5 JULY 1988



JPRS Report

Soviet Union

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 12, December 1987

Soviet Union

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 1, January 1988

JPRS-USA-88-007

CONTENTS

6 JULY 1988

[The following is a translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.]

Washington Summit, INF Treaty Discussed [V.V. Zhurkin; pp 3-9]	1
Problems of Security in Today's World [M.A. Milshteyn; pp 10-19]	4
Changes Required by "New Political Thinking" [A.Yu. Melvil; pp 29-39]	11
Military-Economic Integration of U.S., Canada [T.V. Lavrovskaya; pp 40-48]	18
Presidential Election Year [V.S. Anichkina; pp 49-54]	23
Short Book Reviews [V.V. Presnyakov, I.L. Abalkina et al; pp 111-112]	27
Canadian-Soviet Conference on Disarmament, Regional Conflicts [Ye.I.; pp 122-123]	28
Articles Not Translated from SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 1, January 1988	30
Publication Data	30

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 1, January 1988

Washington Summit, INF Treaty Discussed

AU010841 Moscow SSHA: *EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA* in Russian No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 18 Dec 87) pp 3-9

[Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, deputy director of the United States of America and Canada Institute: "Meeting in Washington"]

[Text] The more time has passed after the end of the Washington meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the United States the more its unfading significance shines out in Soviet-American and international politics as a whole. The Soviet-American political dialogue was further deepened in the course of the meeting. The many years of work to prepare a Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles on a global basis came to a conclusion. The USSR and United States made substantial advances on the problem of nuclear and space weapons: They took important steps on the way toward a treaty on 50 percent reduction in the sides' strategic offensive arms and at the same time toward an agreement to observe the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed and not to withdraw from it for an agreed period. All in all, the results of the Washington summit showed that the United States and the USSR had begun to withdraw from their protracted confrontation.

Of course, the Soviet-American relations of recent decades, with their numerous declines and rare improvements, do not incline one to euphoria. It is all the more important to make a sober and realistic assessment of the position, nature, and dynamics of the present shifts in relations between the two mightiest powers on our planet. These shifts are directly connected with the three summit meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik, and Washington. The prospects for further shifts will depend on how matters progress before and during the fourth such meeting, which is to be held in Moscow this year. Each of the summit meetings in the second half of the eighties has had its own specific features. The Geneva summit in November 1985 is frequently called the "get-acquainted meeting." It produced important positive results, and an understanding was reached that nuclear war must never be unleashed and that there can be no victor in it. Ways were outlined for moving forward in the most important areas of arms reductions. At the same time, this meeting gave impetus to the mutual reinterpretation of relations between the USSR and the United States, and of the situation all over the world: For the first time, America came up against the new foreign policy thinking which the Soviet Union announced in 1985 and has been actively introducing into the practice of international relations.

A special position was occupied by the Reykjavik summit in October 1986, which took place rapidly and dramatically. It provided a political breakthrough in the approach to arms reductions. The ossified traditions which had formed over years and even decades were broken. The possibility was revealed of taking great steps along the road of nuclear arms reduction. The Reykjavik meeting did not produce concrete results in the form of treaties or agreements. However, the Soviet Union showed the whole world there how realistically it approaches the translation of the conceptual theses of new thinking into clear formulae for international obligations. After Reykjavik the sphere of arms reduction, and indeed international life as a whole, began to change fundamentally and to acquire fresh new positive experience.

The Washington meeting was a breakthrough of another kind. For the first time the USSR and the United States signed a treaty on real nuclear disarmament, on the destruction of two classes of nuclear weapon, many hundreds of missiles, and thousands of warheads. The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles by itself raises this meeting to the level of the most important events of postwar years. Many other practical decisions were made, too, including on the central issue of Soviet-American relations—the problem of reducing strategic offensive weapons.

The conceptual foundations of Soviet-American relations were further consolidated and developed at the Washington meeting. Above all, both sides affirmed the conviction expressed solemnly in Geneva that nuclear war must never be unleashed and that there can be no victor in it, and they renewed their obligation not to strive for military superiority. Other fundamental provisions aimed at the consolidation of international peace were added to this. The leaders of both states declared that they are filled with resolution to prevent any war, nuclear or conventional between the USSR and the United States. They expressed their readiness to contribute—in conjunction with other countries and peoples—to building a more secure world on the eve of mankind's entry into the third millennium.

The main practical achievement of the meeting is the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. The concrete substance of the agreement is well-known. It would, however, be worth dwelling on its most important conceptual aspects.

The opponents of disarmament and the normalization of Soviet-American relations fell upon the U.S. President, accusing him of making major concessions to the Soviet Union in the process of preparing the treaty. The question of who made concessions to whom, and how much, and of whether the principles of equality were violated in the course of the negotiation, is, of course, an interesting one.

The complicated and detailed system of documents which makes up this treaty is one of the most precisely regulated international acts, which observes an accurate balance between the two sides' interests and concessions. The Soviet Union took concessionary steps on a number of issues. It agreed not to count the nuclear forces of American allies Britain and France in this treaty, met its partner half-way in negotiations on certain other issues, and finally, the Soviet Union has more missiles and warheads, so it will cut more of them. The United States made concessions with regard to the warheads on the West German Pershing-1A missiles, and on a number of other issues. Particular resistance was engendered among ultra-right-wingers by the administration's readiness to eliminate nuclear missiles which can reach Moscow, given that not one Soviet intermediate-range missile can reach the American mainland.

The regulated balance of interests achieved in the course of the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles serves as a good model for a joint mutually advantageous approach, based on equal rights, to resolving even larger issues of disarmament in the future. The treaty clearly showed how elements of the new way of thinking are beginning to permeate the fabric of international relations.

Everything that this treaty has been able to achieve in the sphere of monitoring and verification of its fulfillment is of very great, truly unfading significance. For many long years the American side was a loud proponent of strict verification of the fulfillment of international agreements, and of on-site inspection. In the process of restructuring its foreign policy activity the Soviet Union radically renewed its approach to questions of verification, and put forward a well-developed program for verification [verifikatsiya] which guarantees each side a firm assurance that the other side is observing the agreement. In the new situation, where the approach to verification has entered the sphere of practical implementation, it has become clear that the previous American standpoint contained a considerable amount of bluff, and the American side has begun to retreat from its former loudly-voiced claims. The Soviet standpoint has finally made it possible to stabilize the position on verification issues. A detailed system of verification [verifikatsiya] has been achieved in the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. It may become a sound basis for the creation of a system of verification [kontrol] in a future treaty on a 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

The uniqueness of the new treaty lies above all in the fact that it will lead to the elimination of a large number of missiles and their nuclear warheads, and not obsolete ones, as in the past, but the most modern and effective ones. A decision has been made on the first genuine measure of nuclear disarmament, and the first step has been made along this historic path.

For the moment it is difficult to say what social psychological shifts in the world will result from the destruction of nuclear weapons which were created only recently. It seems that the start of the destruction of nuclear arsenals, which does not reduce states' security, but on the contrary strengthens this security as well as strategic stability, will gradually lead to a new quality in international relations—the growth of confidence and of faith in the reliability of the nuclear disarmament process.

Of course, the world continues to be complex, and there are still contradictions and international conflicts, and sometimes very acute ones at that. The struggle will continue around questions of disarmament, above all in the United States. This struggle did not die down either before or during the summit. It spread in several dimensions. A political battle unfolded on television screens before the eyes of millions of Americans before and during the days of the meeting.

Ultraright-wingers took part in the acute campaigns against the meeting, raising a real rebellion against the President. On 4 December, the worldly-wise Americans caught their breath when Howard Phillips, president of the Conservative Caucus, and Richard Viguerie, another leader of the American ultraright, showered the President with vulgar abuse on television. This gave rise to an outburst of indignation, and the ultraright wingers settled down for a while, keeping away from television but continuing their actively subversive work on other fronts.

Moreover, the ultra-right-wingers' malicious attacks were only the outward manifestation of the demarcation of U.S. conservative circles. In the course of the televised debates between six Republican and six Democratic presidential candidates which were held shortly before the summit, the Americans were surprised to see that only one of the Republican Party's candidates, Vice President George Bush, actively came out in support of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. Again, the treaty was supported by virtually all the Democratic Party participants in the presidential campaign. It is precisely in conservative circles that plots are being hatched against the treaty during its discussion by the Senate.

Dissension among the conservatives is natural and inevitable. It is, however, an irony of fate that a very important and truly historic international treaty will also depend on the stratagems of the intensifying election campaign in the United States. In the course of this campaign, situations may arise in which candidates for the Senate or the Presidency would decide on an attitude to the treaty on the basis of the situation in a specific state or electoral district, rather than on the basis of an assessment of the treaty's merits. The pre-election campaign clearly makes the picture more complicated.

At the same time, an active role is being taken in the American political arena by such a dominating factor as that of the attitude to the treaty of the population as a whole, and of future voters in particular. Public opinion polls show the high level of support—70 to 80 percent and more—for the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. For this reason political forecasters in America predict with considerable assurance that Senate will approve the treaty (a $\frac{2}{3}$ majority is needed), and that the opposition will be unable to get any amendment passed that calls for new negotiations on some specific point. This does not however, rule out serious political skirmishes in Senate, where up to 2 dozen extreme right-wing conservatives intend to fight the treaty.

However, the political noise made by the opponents of arms reductions and of the consolidation of international security will not be able to reduce the significance of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, which has already become part of history as a major achievement of practical disarmament. It is also extraordinarily important because it opened the way to new achievements on an even larger scale in this sphere and lent new dynamism to the resolution of the main task facing mankind—that of preventing a nuclear apocalypse.

If the Washington summit had been confined to the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles it would still have gone down in history as a most important international event. Impressive new shifts were, however, achieved in the solution of a most important problem of Soviet-American relations.

The leaders of the two powers gave detailed new instructions to the delegations conducting negotiations on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons on the basis of ABM Treaty observance. A significant advance was made in the qualitative parameters of strategic offensive arms reductions, the system of verification, individual points of disagreement such as the issue of sea-launched cruise missiles, and other problems.

The delegations working in Geneva were instructed to formulate an accord which would bind both sides to observe the ABM Treaty as it stood when it was signed in 1972, including the processes of research, development, and, where necessary, testing, which are permitted in the ABM Treaty. The sides will assume an obligation not to withdraw from the accord for an agreed period. It was determined that if the USSR and the United States do not reach agreement by the end of the set time-frame for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, each side will have the right to determine its own form of action.

There is no doubt that the USSR and U.S. delegations conducting negotiations in Geneva will have to carry out a large amount of work to conclude the process of

preparing documents on strategic weapons. The leaderships of both the Soviet Union and the United States will both have to work. It is clear, however, that as a result of the Washington summit both powers have made significant advances on the problem of nuclear and space weapons, which is the most important and complex one. The work which has been done inspires confidence that the sides will be able to conclude the preparations for a treaty on strategic offensive weapons reduction by the time the summit meeting in Moscow takes place.

The solution of these most important problems opens up the possibility of adopting a new and more resolute approach to other disarmament issues which the Soviet side has been posing for a long time now: the reduction of conventional weapons, the prohibition of chemical weapons, the cessation of nuclear tests, and so on.

One of the main theses of the opponents of the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and the reduction of strategic offensive weapons is the assertion that a decrease in nuclear weapons would lead to an increased threat of conventional nonnuclear war, above all in Europe. A system of views which retained nuclear and conventional weapons and stimulated the arms race developed over decades in the West, with the United States playing an active and dominant role. These views are based on the concept of the unshakeable nature of nuclear "deterrence," which is called upon to perpetuate the mass presence of American nuclear weapons in Europe, the development of NATO's military structure on this basis, and the predominance of the system of military relations on the European continent to the detriment of political, economic, and humanitarian relations. The thesis of the decisive "deterrent" role of nuclear weapons lies at the center of this system of views, which are obsolete but deep-rooted in the West, and which condemn Europe to be perpetually in the grip of a military-political confrontation.

The political realities of the end of the 20th century fundamentally contradict this ossified system, which formed under the specific conditions of the "cold war." The requirements of normal development of the European states in both West and East are constantly coming into conflict with the system of confrontation which has formed on the continent between million-strong armies equipped with the most powerful conventional and nuclear weapons in history, the use of which would put an end to the human species.

The European countries have been trying to escape from the fetters of confrontation for a long time now. Evidence of this is provided by the all-European process, which does not always develop evenly, but which has recently been marked by major positive shifts. A most important requirement for further successful development is the development of new concepts and ideas which would transfer the situation in Europe to a basis for normalization, for mutual consideration of one another's interests, and for gradual but stable economic,

political, cultural, and other cooperation. An indispensable condition for such a course of affairs in Europe is that of blunting the acute edge of confrontation, dismantling its especially dangerous elements, and gradually replacing "deterrence" based on the threat of mutual destruction with a calm and constructive system of interaction.

In the last year or year and a half the USSR and its allies have come out with a number of fundamentally new initiatives aimed at easing and subsequently dismantling the confrontation and at consolidating stability in Europe. The Warsaw Pact member states have proposed a developed system of measures, including the reduction of armed forces and weapons, a decrease in the level of military expenditure, and a change in the structure of the sides' armed forces, measures which are intended to weaken and then entirely eliminate the possibilities of inflicting a first strike. These proposals pay particular attention to the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons. They take account of proposals made both in the West and in the East about the creation of nuclear-free zones in individual regions of Europe, and of corridors dividing the sides' forces along their line of immediate contact. The Warsaw Pact countries have also submitted proposals to the West on giving military doctrines a strictly defensive character. These initiatives are accompanied by concrete proposals for meetings and for the development of joint approaches at the most diverse levels—state, political, and military figures, the representatives of military alliances, and experts.

The NATO countries have avoided answering these proposals or coming out with their own initiatives. It has been through their will that a situation full of internal contradictions has developed. On the one hand, concern is expressed about the potential of conventional weapons, in the context of the reduction in the level of American-Soviet nuclear confrontation. On the other hand, there has been a passive attitude to the numerous proposals intended to stabilize the situation, decrease the potentials of conventional weapons, and reduce the numbers of armed forces.

Sooner or later the problems of stabilizing the military-political situation in Europe will have to be resolved. Practical work will have to be done on reducing the levels and acuteness of military confrontation, and on the examination of the new concepts of a reasonable sufficiency of states' armed forces and of defensive strategy, concepts which are being advanced by the USSR and other socialist states in an increasingly persistent manner.

The future large-scale talks on arms and armed forces reductions in Europe within the framework of the all-European process are expected to play an important role in ensuring that the situation in Europe stabilizes within the framework of decreased levels of nuclear confrontation. These talks and the subsequent reductions in the

zone from the Atlantic to the Urals will lead to further normalization of the situation and to the consolidation of stability on the continent.

The meeting of leaders of the Warsaw Pact member states which was held on December 11 1987, immediately after the Washington meeting, confirmed the readiness of the allied socialist countries to adhere to the limits of sufficiency necessary for defense, and to solve the problem of asymmetry and imbalances in individual types of weapons by cutting those of whoever is ahead.

Extreme right-wing figures in the United States such as Jeane Kirkpatrick and Richard Perle, have attacked the Washington meeting for the fact that so much time was devoted to problems of disarmament there. These attacks are unjustified. It is true that the main issues of disarmament were at the center of attention. A distinguishing feature of the meeting, however, was the intensive dialogue on regional problems, the thorough and frank discussion of human rights issues and humanitarian questions, and lastly the serious study of the entire complex of bilateral Soviet-American relations, including concrete accords and agreements on cooperation.

Summit meetings always combine the manifestation of political, economic, and many other state and social factors with the interaction of personal factors. These are not conventional foreign policy negotiations, but meetings between state leaders, whose personalities make a mark on the course and decisions of these meetings. This aspect of the Washington summit was outlined by a commentator of the CNN television company when he described the meeting thus: "Reagan wanted to show America to Gorbachev and make a great impression on him. It turned out that Gorbachev showed himself to America and made a great impression on it." The Washington meeting was a revelation for many millions of Americans.

The results of the meeting will be discussed for a long time to come. New accords and agreements will increasingly mature in the process of the ongoing talks and of the entire development of international relations.

A summit meeting in the Soviet capital lies ahead, from which mankind is awaiting further progress in the improvement of the international situation.

Problems of Security in Today's World

18030005b Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 18 Dec 87) pp 10-19

[Article by Mikhail Abramovich Milshteyn, doctor of historical sciences, lieutenant-general (retired), and senior researcher at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies]

[Text] Many experts and scientists in the United States have much to say and write today about the need for a new way of thinking and for new approaches to military

problems and security issues. They are saying that the earlier military strategies which became part of nuclear strategy are not only hopelessly outdated but have also become dangerous under present conditions and that any further reliance on nuclear strategy could have irreparable effects.

McNamara, for example, writes the following in his book "Blundering into Disaster": "Alas, the emperor was wearing no clothes. Our present nuclear strategy is bankrupt.... How long will it take us to realize this?"¹ People usually listen to McNamara because he was the U.S. secretary of defense for 7 years and is considered to be the godfather of many American military strategies, including "assured destruction," and one of the authors of the strategy of "flexible response," which is still the main NATO military doctrine.

"The existing nuclear strategy is increasing the risk of nuclear war. The United States...needs a new strategy,"² agreed M. Halperin, who has been on the staff of the U.S. Defense Department and the National Security Council.

The nuclear strategy of the United States has gone through several stages of development. This has not always been a smooth and even process. On the contrary, the brief "golden age" of the atomic monopoly was followed by the gloomy days of its unexpected loss; there have been constant calculations and miscalculations, hopes and disappointments, a reckless willingness to start a nuclear war and, fortunately for mankind, including the people of the United States, the fears that have frustrated these insane plans. During different stages Washington's nuclear strategy has included various military-strategic concepts, particularly the doctrines of "massive retaliation" and "assured destruction," "counterforce" and "flexible response," and so on and so forth.

The principal, deciding factor of the transition from one stage to another and from one concept to another has been the changing balance of U.S.-USSR nuclear forces. The nuclear strategy of the United States was commonly called "nuclear deterrence."

This implied that American military strategy was of a defensive nature—i.e., was intended to deter war. In fact, the term "deterrence" always served as a cover for the real plans to fight and win a nuclear war. When the term first came into being, President Eisenhower defined it in this way: "We must always be ready to inflict greater losses on the enemy than he plans to inflict on us. This will be a deterrent."³ In our own time, C. Weinberger⁴ declared: "If deterrence does not work and a war with the Soviet Union breaks out, the United States must have enough superior force to compel the Soviet Union to seek a rapid end to the war on terms benefiting the United States."⁵

Therefore, the strategy of "nuclear deterrence" has never been defensive. It has only been a matter of "deterrence through intimidation" on the basis of U.S. superiority.

This demanded the continuous buildup of nuclear arms, their improvement, the development of increasingly sophisticated types, and the discovery of new channels for the arms race. "Deterrence" ultimately turned into something like an insatiable monster demanding more and more nuclear warheads and carriers. The higher their number rose, the more unreliable the security of the United States and of other countries became. This is how the potential for suicide was created, and this is how the world was put in such a precarious position that any plans to use accumulated nuclear weapons are tantamount to plans for suicide and worldwide disaster. Now the sides have had to engage in long and agonizing talks on how to reduce this potential and get rid of the "surplus."

The strategy of "nuclear deterrence" also performed another function. It served to conceal and camouflage real strategy and the elaboration of specific plans to use nuclear weapons and fight a nuclear war. While "deterrence" was being discussed at the official level, at the level of declared policy, operational plans for the delivery of nuclear strikes, called the "Single Integrated Operation Plan" (SIOP), were being drawn up by an extremely limited group of people in the silence of war offices and in an atmosphere of the utmost secrecy. The SIOP reflected the real nuclear strategy of the United States. It usually listed targets, the means of their destruction, intelligence data, anticipated results, etc. The compilation of this kind of plan, in contrast to the compilation of strategic plans in the past, prior to the birth of nuclear weapons, apparently did not require sound strategic reasoning, talented commanders, or a thorough analysis of the strategic situation. The details of this kind of plan depended only on the existence of nuclear weapons, the means of their delivery, and designated targets.

The plans frequently did not contain any discussion of general aims or stipulate what the different branches of the armed forces were supposed to do after the plan of attack had been carried out, and if there was any mention of this, it was only in the most general terms. In November 1947, when these plans began to be compiled, General Vandenberg, chief of Air Force staff and one of the officials responsible for their compilation, was already asking this question: "In a war with the Soviet Union our goal would be the destruction of the Russian people or industry, or the communist hierarchy, or all of these.... Will this require an occupation and a change in structure after the victory over Russia or will we confine ourselves to simply destroying it and then leaving any subsequent restoration up to Russia itself?"⁶

Some plans for the delivery of nuclear strikes against the USSR were recently declassified in the United States. "A careful look at these documents," the authors of "To Win a Nuclear War" assert, "shows that despite the public statements about 'deterrence' and 'defense,' the

Pentagon's real nuclear strategy consists in using nuclear weapons for the purpose of intimidation, fighting a war, surviving it, and even 'winning' it."⁷

And it is true that the published documents and the analyses of them⁸ clearly indicate that these plans envisage the possibility of a first and pre-emptive strike and, of course, of a U.S. victory in the war. They envisage strikes against cities and military installations, "decapitating strikes," "counter-force strikes," etc. The history of the development of nuclear strategy, however, indicates that the U.S. nuclear arsenal has developed in a haphazard manner. Ever since the birth of nuclear weapons, no long-range plans have been drawn up in the United States for the accumulation of these weapons, and no criteria have been chosen to serve as the basis of such plans. The question of how many nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles would be enough for the United States was never answered in the past and is not being answered in the present. What should the minimum and maximum levels of nuclear weapons for "deterrence" be—i.e., what are the accumulation and saturation limits? In McNamara's opinion, "the 25,000 warheads each side has at this time were not the result of planned development."⁹ The data in the table on some plans for nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union from the time of their inception to 1980 provide graphic evidence of this.¹⁰

Desmond Ball, the author of many studies of American plans to deliver nuclear strikes, once made the accurate observation that "the question of the nature of plans for nuclear strikes is central to the appraisal of nuclear strategy."¹¹ The table shows how the number of targets and of designated weapons rose sharply with each year: From 1945 to 1947 the number of targets was confined to 20 Soviet cities. It is true that the plan did not say how 20 cities were to be attacked at the end of 1945 or in June 1946 by the two or nine bombs in existence at that time. Between 1945 and 1947 the United States had difficulty producing one bomb a month, but now it produces 160-170 nuclear weapons a month.¹² Between December 1948 and 1950 other targets were listed in addition to cities. By 1980 the total number of targets had risen to 40,000. In any case, the constant rise in their number required the continuous augmentation of means of destruction—the number of nuclear weapons and their carriers. "The list of targets," Ball writes, "was lengthened to substantiate the need to build up strategic forces."¹³ In any event, this buildup was not substantiated by the requirements of the strategy of "nuclear deterrence." The exact calculations and criteria lying at the basis of this kind of planning are still not known.

Name of plan	Date of compilation	Planned attack	Number of nuclear bombs (or weapons) possessed
JIC-329/1	December 1945	From 20 to 30 bombs on 20 cities	2
Pincher	July 1946	50 bombs on 20 cities	9
Broiler	1948	34—on 20	35/50
Frolic (or Grabber)	May 1948	50—on 20	50
Sizzle	December 1948	133—on 70	150
Trojan	January 1949	Same	Same
Shakedown	October 1949	220—on 104	250
Dropshot	1949	300—on 200	250
SAC	1950	300 targets	450
"	1954	—	1,750
"	1956	2,997 targets	3,550
"	1957	3,261 targets	5,450
SIOP-62	December 1960	3,423 targets	18,500
SIOP-63	1962	—	26,500
SIOP-5	1974	25,000 targets	29,000
SIOP-5D	1980	40,000 targets	25,000

Source: D. Ball, "Targeting for Strategic Deterrence," ADELPHI PAPERS, 1983, No 185.

In 1953 a select committee on strategic assessment reported that "around 400 atom bombs like the one dropped on Nagasaki" would be enough to carry out these plans. There was also the confidential report that if 100 such bombs hit their targets, this would be "enough to destroy the nation." By 1957, however, 5,450 nuclear weapons were to be used against 3,261 targets.

In June 1962 McNamara announced that "nuclear war must be approached in the same way as operations in a conventional war. This means that the principal military

aim in a nuclear war should be the destruction of armed forces, and not the civilian population."¹⁴ These views did not last long, however, and by 1964 another concept was being advanced—the concept of "assured destruction," declaring that the United States should have the nuclear potential to inflict unacceptable losses on the Soviet Union in a nuclear conflict, regardless of how the conflict starts. According to Pentagon calculations, these losses were to constitute from 20 to 33 percent of the population and from 50 to 67 percent of industry.¹⁵

The question of the approximate number and type of nuclear weapons needed to attain these goals, however, was never answered. The Carter Administration's secretary of defense, H. Brown, believed that the destruction of at least 200 Soviet cities would be an essential condition for the attainment of the goals of "assured destruction" or the infliction of "unacceptable losses."¹⁶

What would this have taken? Under the influence of the contradictory strategy of "deterrence," which could portray any kind of military plan as a "deterrent," both the number of nuclear weapons and the number of targets continued to display intensive growth. In 1960 there were more than 3,400 such targets, in 1965 there were 6,300, and in 1970 there were 6,955. In 1962 plans already called for the use of 26,500 nuclear weapons, and by 1967 the U.S. nuclear arsenal consisted of 32,000 weapons.¹⁷ It is not clear why such huge quantities of nuclear weapons were needed or how this fit into the strategy of "deterrence" or the concept of "assured destruction." There were no reasonable explanations for this and, in fact, there could not have been any. One thing is clear: The strategy of "nuclear deterrence" actually led to the creation of the potential for overkill. It was no coincidence that the history of American nuclear strategy was described by former U.S. Secretary of Defense and Director of the CIA J. Schlesinger as "quicksand."¹⁸

President J. Carter was probably the only postwar president to attempt to answer the simple question of what would be sufficient for "minimal deterrence" or, in other words, what would be needed for real deterrence rather than for fighting a war under the cover of "deterrence." Just before his inauguration in January 1977, Carter informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that just 200 ballistic missiles would be enough, in his opinion, for minimal deterrence.¹⁹ This left the JCS speechless.

Unfortunately, the search for criteria for "minimal deterrence" ended on this note. Furthermore, the concept of "minimal deterrence" was called dangerous. And in place of "minimal deterrence," the nuclear arsenal continued to be built up and improved during the years of the Carter Administration. It was this administration that approved the programs for the MX, the Trident II, the Pershing II, the cruise missiles, etc.

Members of the Reagan Administration have recently talked and written about a transition to a new strategic concept which, according to them, consists in "a move from the national strategy based on offensive deterrence to a strategy of deterrence based on offensive and defensive weapons systems."

In this connection, P. Nitze, the President's special adviser on arms control, said that "our intention is to move from deterrence based primarily on the ultimate threat of a destructive retaliatory nuclear strike to a system of deterrence in which defensive non-nuclear

weapons will play a more important role."²⁰ Furthermore, it has been stressed that the move to this concept of deterrence would be the most radical change in U.S. strategy since the adoption of the concept of "assured destruction."

What does all of this mean? To what new concept are the members of the Reagan Administration referring? It is not too difficult to answer these questions. In essence, the administration now wants to rely on a strategy based not only the use of strategic offensive nuclear potential but also on the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI). This is what the "combination of offensive and defensive weapons systems" will be. In essence, first-strike potential is being created with the expectation that the other side's countermeasures will not inflict unacceptable losses if the United States has broad-scale missile defense, at least not the kind of losses that could be incurred in the absence of the SDI.

Therefore, the "new" concept of deterrence will destabilize the situation even more because of the need for Soviet countermeasures and, consequently, will lead to a new dangerous round of the arms race. The combination of offensive and defensive systems (in the form of the SDI) is certainly not the right way to achieve a nuclear-free world or even to simply reduce the nuclear threat. This would require the renunciation of the SDI and the radical reduction of nuclear arsenals.

Therefore, the reliance on nuclear "deterrence" has not strengthened security or diminished the threat of war. On the contrary, the danger of nuclear war has increased. The need for a constant nuclear arms race, the constant improvement of these arms, and constant attempts to gain some kind of advantage lie at the basis of the doctrine of "deterrence." It has created illusions and false expectations of the possibility of preventing a war or ending it on favorable terms. It is preventing the cessation of the arms race because it has doomed both sides to keeping the latest nuclear weapons in a high state of readiness and constantly improving and augmenting them. At the same time, it has created an atmosphere of uncertainty, mistrust, and suspicion.

The entire experience of the development of the doctrine of "nuclear deterrence" has proved that the problems of security and the prevention of war cannot be solved by stockpiling and improving weapons, by perfecting the shield and the sword.

There is scarcely any doubt that integrated operation plans are still being drawn up, and perhaps even more thoroughly and intensively than in the past, or that the Reagan Administration's plans of attack are aimed at the same kind of "deterrence" as in the past—i.e., at the possibility of fighting a nuclear war and winning it. The current situation, however, is different in many respects: The nuclear countries have accumulated more than 50,000 weapons, and the United States is adding around 2,000 nuclear weapons a year to its arsenal. The world is

now on the brink of a new round of the arms race which could have irreversible effects. The miniaturization of nuclear weapons, the improvement of carriers, the enhancement of accuracy, the creation of mobile systems, the development, testing, and launching of space weapons, and the deployment of land-, sea-, and air-based long-range cruise missiles—all of this is undermining the possibility of control and verification and the conclusion of arms control agreements, is disrupting strategic stability and, in addition to all of this, is leading to the qualitative improvement of existing systems and the creation of new ones, which will increase the danger of nuclear war, including the danger of the accidental start of this kind of war.

Today it is commonly acknowledged that a nuclear war, regardless of how it starts, will certainly lead to worldwide disaster and the possible end of human civilization.

The simple acknowledgement of the disastrous consequences of nuclear war is not enough, however, because it alone can do nothing to change strategic plans, military programs, military doctrines, or strategy itself.

After all, it is wrong to acknowledge that nuclear conflict will be a disaster for everyone and to simultaneously continue drawing up plans for nuclear attacks with the aim of inflicting "unacceptable losses" or plans for fighting a nuclear war in general.

More than 40 years ago, soon after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, American military theorist B. Brodie was already writing that "prior to this (prior to the appearance of nuclear weapons—M.M.), the chief aim of our military was to plan how to win a war. Since that time the chief aim has had to be the prevention of war. There can be no other aim."²¹ Unfortunately, the American military paid no attention to this advice. Plans for fighting and winning a war continued to be compiled.

The very term "victory in a nuclear war," however, has absolutely no connection with the concept of "victory." War has always been regarded as a means of attaining some definite goal. There is the well-known statement that war is the continuation of diplomacy by other means. It is impossible, however, to attain political goals with the aid of nuclear war, and planning to win this kind of war is profane and illogical. The realization of this demands a new way of thinking, including thinking in the military sphere and in the science of war. But everyone knows that military thinking and the science of war probably display the greatest conservatism and inertia. It is obvious that military thinking was not the last thing Albert Einstein had in mind when he made his famous statement that nuclear weapons have changed everything but our way of thinking.

The new way of thinking should proceed primarily from the realization that safeguarding security is a political matter, not a military one, and can only be accomplished by political means, and that the security of the United

States and the USSR can only be mutual, while security in the case of international relations in general can only be universal. In the nuclear-space age the world has become too fragile for wars and power politics. This is why the primary requisite of a military doctrine is that it must be genuinely defensive and must be aimed at preventing war. This should be based not on verbal declarations and assurances, but on specific plans and programs of military construction, the composition of armed forces, the quantity and quality of weapons, and the creation and development of arms. Furthermore, the defensive nature of military doctrine and strategy must be mutually acknowledged. It would be impossible to overestimate the exceptional importance of an accurate understanding of one another's military doctrines. It is these doctrines that stipulate the goals and intentions of states and politico-military alliances in the military sphere.

The entire postwar period, however, has been marked by the accumulation of mutual suspicions and mistrust, incorrect ideas about one another, and misinterpretations of plans and intentions, usually with expectations of the "worst case." It will take time and mutual effort to erase all of this. This is precisely why the Warsaw Pact states proposed consultations at the level of authoritative experts, with the participation of military experts from both sides, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, for the purpose of comparing the military doctrines of the two alliances and analyzing their nature. The experts are to engage in objective and impartial examinations and frank explanations of the content and purpose of the military doctrines of the two sides and the possible patterns of their evolution. The purpose of this kind of meeting would be the achievement of a better understanding of one another's intentions and the presentation of acceptable testimony to the fact that military concepts and doctrines are based on defensive principles so that neither side will have any grounds for fears and anxiety, even if only imaginary ones, about its security. Regular joint consultations of this kind could aid in creating an absolutely new atmosphere in the strategic interrelations of the two sides and lead to the abandonment of outdated concepts and dangerous stereotypes with regard to one another. There is no question that these consultations would also facilitate the quickest possible conclusion of agreements at arms control talks. In combination with the proposals still in force regarding meetings between Warsaw Pact and NATO supreme commanders and contacts between their general secretaries, this initiative will offer broader opportunities for dialogue between the politico-military alliances to strengthen confidence and lower the level of confrontation. All of these proposals are based on the belief that the new way of thinking, especially in the military sphere, can only be successful on a mutual basis. This is why the military doctrines must be compared, to disclose the goals and intentions of states and politico-military alliances. The Soviet Union's proposals were also dictated by the urgent need for concerted effort in the elaboration of a single concept of universal security in the spirit of

glasnost and openness that is characteristic of our country today and should be extended to the military sphere, which was always the most sensitive and secretive sphere in the past.

This does not mean that consultations and meetings can eliminate disagreements between our countries, especially in assessments of one another's plans and intentions, but it is important to keep these disagreements from leading to military confrontations and heightened tension, and it is important to firmly acknowledge the absence of fatal contradictions dooming the USSR and United States to confrontation, not to mention war.

The only solution guaranteeing the fundamental and total avoidance of nuclear disaster is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In spite of the common acknowledgement of the disastrous consequences of their use and in spite of statements like the one Ronald Reagan made on 20 January 1985 when he began his second term as president, that "our goal is to rid the earth of nuclear weapons," the USSR's proposal of 15 January 1986 on the gradual elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000 did not win the necessary support, and not only among Western politicians but even among the majority of scientists. Some said that the nuclear weapon could not be "un-invented," others said that the avoidance of war to date had been due precisely to the existence of nuclear weapons, still others asserted that their complete elimination would supposedly give the Warsaw Pact military advantages because of its superior conventional forces, and a fourth group could not exclude the possibility of the appearance of nuclear weapons in South Africa, Israel, Brazil, and Pakistan, or in the hands of terrorists. Statements were made about the impossibility of verification and so forth.

In general, this is not an unexpected reaction. After all, this would be security without nuclear weapons, and this is the main, if not revolutionary, premise of the new approach: the safeguarding of security without nuclear weapons at a low level of military confrontation and with a view to the principle of equivalent security in general. This goes against all of the earlier beliefs about nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence (or intimidation) as the main means of safeguarding security. What were the reasons for this reaction?

The first reason, of course, is conservative thinking, inertia, and the tenacity of certain stereotypes. It is difficult to suddenly give up something that has held human thinking captive for decades. This is still a comfortable state of mind for many people in the West.

The second reason is the desire to continue dealing from a position of strength with the aid of nuclear weapons.

The third is the interest of certain groups in the arms race.

The fourth is the intention of influential groups in the West to exert economic pressure on the Soviet Union with the aid of the arms race.

The new way of thinking is starting to take root, however, and has started affecting decisions made at the international level. One example is the Stockholm conference, where agreements were reached on confidence-building measures and on non-aggression. Another example was the USSR-U.S. treaty signed in Washington on 8 December 1987 on medium- and shorter-range missiles.

In his book "The Fate of the Earth," Jonathan Schell wrote: "If we are honest with ourselves, we must admit that until we get rid of our nuclear arsenals, universal annihilation is not only possible but also unavoidable, if not today then tomorrow, if not this year then the next. We are used to living on borrowed time. Each year mankind lives on the earth is a borrowed year and each day is a borrowed day."²²

Existing nuclear strategy and alternatives to deterrence are now being discussed and assessed in the United States at various levels. These attempts were intensified after the advancement of the Soviet proposal on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the next 15 years. According to S. Talbott, the chief of TIME magazine's Washington bureau, "many U.S. institutions engaged in foreign policy analysis are conducting conferences, symposiums, and research to study the essence of the 'new thinking' and 'mutual security.'" The previously mentioned books by R. McNamara and M. Halperin also propose new and more acceptable, in their opinion, concepts corresponding to the realities of the nuclear-space age. Both propose the retention of only minimal "deterrence" potential, numbering a few hundred warheads, and stipulate that even these should not be thought of as weapons. McNamara, for example, writes in his book about the retention of approximately 500 projectiles on each side. He recommends that military plans be compiled on the assumption "that nuclear warheads are weapons which cannot be used."²³ In other words, he is proposing the reconsideration of the military role of nuclear weapons.

All of these proposals and ideas are of considerable interest and warrant serious consideration. We must repeat that the Soviet proposal of 15 January 1986 suggested a specific sequence for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific time frame. A certain number of weapons would be retained in each successive phase until the last, at which time the elimination of nuclear arms would be completed and there would be no more nuclear weapons on earth. Is this realistic or is it an illusion? When this topic was debated in the NEW YORK TIME MAGAZINE, one participant in the discussion expressed this opinion: "If we cannot imagine a world without nuclear weapons, we are doomed. Nuclear weapons have killed our imagination and our strength to build another world."²⁴

Has this happened? We repeat: The only alternative to the doctrine of nuclear "deterrence" is a nuclear-free, non-violent world.

Let us summarize some of our findings. Under present conditions the strategy of "nuclear deterrence" is not only obsolete and contradictory but also extremely dangerous. We have already discussed its ability to stimulate the arms race and the qualitative improvement of arms by envisaging the possibility of a preventive strike and even a first strike. For this reason, it naturally cannot serve as a guarantee of security in the future. The real guarantee is the use of only political means to safeguard security, the cessation of the arms race, the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, and the institution of other measures to strengthen trust between states. Stronger trust is the key which will open the door to new approaches and new solutions meeting the requirements of the nuclear-space age. It would be wrong to say that no steps are being taken in this direction. The attendance of troop maneuvers by observers from the other side, the publication of annual military plans in accordance with agreements concluded as part of the Helsinki process, the increased volume and depth of mutual verification and control with regard to commitments, and other such facts testify that the new way of thinking and new approaches to security issues are taking root. Of course, all of this is still not enough for a decisive move toward the replacement of the strategy of nuclear "deterrence" with a new strategy which will be adopted mutually and will serve as the basis for stronger trust between states and common security. Strong momentum for a move in this direction could be provided by an agreement on a defensive strategy (perhaps in place of the strategy of "nuclear deterrence") based on the principle of sufficiency. This would entail the mutual admission and mutual conviction that the two sides would have forces sufficient only to safeguard security and repulse aggression through defensive operations but absolutely insufficient for offensive operations. In this event, by mutual agreement, armed forces would have the kind of structure and the kind of weapons that would exclude even the technical possibility of a surprise attack or offensive operations. Obviously, this certainly would not be a simple matter and it would require the abandonment of earlier and long-obsolete stereotypes. It would also require the mutual reduction of military potential to the level at which the two sides could safeguard their security but neither side would have the forces and means to conduct offensive operations.

At festivities commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, M.S. Gorbachev announced that "the Warsaw Pact states have addressed NATO and all European countries with a proposal to reduce armed forces and arms to the level of reasonable sufficiency. They have invited them to compare the military doctrines of the two alliances for the purpose of giving them an exclusively defensive nature."²⁵ The acceptance of all of these proposals would change the situation in Europe dramatically by strengthening stability and common security.

The specific measures reflecting the new approaches could also include pledges by states not to ever, under any circumstances, take military actions first against any other state or alliance of states and never use nuclear weapons first.

As for military confrontation in Europe, a supervised withdrawal of nuclear and other offensive weapons from borders with the subsequent creation of zones with a lower concentration of arms along borders and demilitarized zones between the sides, the creation of nuclear-free corridors and zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons, and so forth would be of great significance.

Obviously, other such measures might also be proposed.

One thing is clear: The new situation requires new approaches based on the premise that any disputes, disagreements, or problems should occur under the conditions of peaceful coexistence and be resolved exclusively by political means.

Footnotes

1. R. McNamara, "Blundering into Disaster. Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age," New York, 1986, p 138.
2. M. Halperin, "Nuclear Fallacy. Dispelling the Myth of Nuclear Strategy," Cambridge (Mass.), 1987, p 74.
3. M. Kaku and D. Axelrod, "To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon's Secret War Plans," Boston, 1987, p 95.
4. The secretary of defense in the two Reagan administrations who retired in November 1987.
5. "Report of the Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger to the Congress, FY 1988," Washington, 1987, p 46.
6. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 1983, p 13.
7. M. Kaku and D. Axelrod, Op. cit., p 3.
8. See SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1985, No 5, p 36, and some recent American works on this subject, such as: M. Halperin, Op. cit.; M. Kaku and D. Axelrod, Op. cit.
9. R. McNamara, Op. cit., p 122.
10. M. Kaku and D. Axelrod, Op. cit., pp x, xi.
11. D. Ball, "Targeting for Strategic Deterrence," ADELPHI PAPERS, 1983, No 185, p 1.
12. M. Kaku and D. Axelrod, Op. cit., p 43; R. McNamara, Op. cit., p 80.
13. D. Ball, Op. cit., p 40.

14. Ibid., p 11.
15. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Winter 1979, p 54.
16. H. Brown, "Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1979," Washington, 1978, p 55.
17. D. Ball, Op. cit., p 40; "Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol 1, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities," Cambridge (Mass.), 1984, p 15.
18. J. Schlesinger, "Uses and Abuses of Analysis," in "Planning, Programming, Budgeting," Washington, 1970, p 133.
19. S. Talbott, "Endgame. The Inside Story of SALT II," New York, 1979, p 43.
20. BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, June/July 1986, p 4.
21. "The Absolute Weapon," edited by B. Brodie, New York, 1946, p 76.
22. J. Schell, "The Fate of the Earth," New York, 1982, pp 163-164.
23. R. McNamara, Op. cit., p 111.
24. THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 4 April 1987, p 49.
25. PRAVDA, 3 November 1987.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

8588

Changes Required by "New Political Thinking"
18030005c Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 18 Dec 87) pp 29-39

[Article by Andrey Yuryevich Melvil, doctor of philosophical sciences and sector head at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "The 'Enemy Image' and the New Political Thinking"]

[Text] "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed," the UNESCO constitution states. "Throughout human history mutual misunderstanding has been the cause of suspicion and mistrust between peoples, and their disagreements have led to wars too frequently." It is true that relations between states and peoples have always been accompanied, with rare exceptions, by mutual mistrust, friction, suspicion, and hostility. Mankind has always paid a high price for this, but today, in the nuclear age, it is simply exorbitant. There is the unprecedented threat of a nuclear doomsday, the

danger of a fatal mistake which could be the result of an incorrect decision, of the misinterpretation of the other side's intentions and actions, including its reactions to the first side's actions, or of miscalculations.

The fueling of negative emotions, the intensification of the atmosphere of suspicion, and the escalation of tension and hostility are impermissible under these conditions because they can destabilize international relations even more and can prevent rational and responsible behavior.

Bringing our thinking in line with the radical changes in the world around us and making the move to the new political thinking will, however, be an extremely difficult task and will often be psychologically painful, demanding a certain level of emotional preparedness as well as great political courage. The move to the new political thinking, the new morality, and the new mentality of the nuclear-space age will not only put a strain on the human mind, requiring the exertion of man's ability to reason, so that the essence of the dramatic changes taking place in the world can be fully comprehended, but will also require considerable psychological reorientation.

This is a task facing all of us who were raised on the traditions of the past and who are sometimes inclined to regard them as the only possible standard. The task will also be difficult because the road to the new political thinking is not only blocked by visible political and ideological obstacles but also by invisible barriers—psychological and emotional obstacles, including those engendered by the natural resistance of the consciousness with a traditional upbringing and attempts at the psychological denial of excessively painful or traumatic information. Furthermore, this psychological defense mechanism is sometimes intellectually appealing because it relieves us of the need to exert our intellect and to delve into all of the details of the cardinal issues of the nuclear age and it allows us to act on familiar and customary beliefs and ideas.

If the outside world is viewed through the prism of common ideological stereotypes, if hostile feelings are prevalent in this view of the world, and if it is seen only as two extremes—"black" and "white" or "evil" and "good"—and there is reluctance to see new problems and their interconnections which go against traditional beliefs, policy will ignore new realities of vital importance to human survival and will continue to develop in the old channels inherited from pre-nuclear times. If another state is regarded as an absolute "enemy," as the "evil empire," or as the "most inhumane system in human history," the personification and epitome of everything despicable, then policy toward this state will be built on these premises and will lead to the escalation of hostility. And it must be said that this logic of traditional political thinking is almost the rule in relations between states. In short, it has the great force of tradition on its side.

If, on the other hand, the view of the world is free of convenient and customary biases, if a state is willing to acknowledge the multidimensional and interconnected nature of new developments and processes, based on an awareness of the cardinal changes in the world that are dictating the need for the radical revision of traditional political concepts, then the standards of the new political thinking, the new morality, and the new mentality of the nuclear-space age can serve as the basis of policy and as the basis of the concrete behavior of the state in international affairs. Only this approach can aid in the comprehension of the fundamentally new elements the nuclear age is introducing into relations between states.

The connection between policy and psychology is particularly strong here. The realization of the need for a new mentality usually precedes actual changes in policy, but the mentality can only undergo a complete change after the change in policy.

Of course, a more accurate view of the surrounding world, the refusal to postulate unattainable ideals, the abandonment of biases and prejudices against other countries and peoples, and the formation of less distorted beliefs about their goals and intentions are still no guarantee that dangerous international conflicts and tension will disappear forever. Many, if not most, of these conflicts are engendered not by false ideas, but by absolutely real—economic, political, and ideological—causes, diverging interests, and contradictions and they cannot be reduced to a distorted view of our surroundings and of other countries. In any case, however, false ideas, stereotypes, and biases compound existing problems and disagreements and preclude the search for mutually acceptable decisions and compromises.

Today, now that the political stakes are so high, now that an incorrect decision based on outdated prejudices could lead to a fatal error for all mankind, it is particularly dangerous to dehumanize the adversary and to turn the other side into a symbol of "absolute evil" and see the adversary only as an "absolute enemy" devoid of human features. This is another area where we must make a radical break with tradition and develop new attitudes toward partners in the international arena, a break with the traditional political thinking in which a rival in the world arena is regarded as the "enemy."

Throughout history the "enemy image" has traditionally been one of the main elements of international tension, conflicts, and wars. States and peoples considered to be enemies have been defined in different ways throughout the centuries in different societies and cultures. The causes of conflicts, rivalry, and enmity have differed, and it is obvious that the conflicts and wars were not engendered directly by the "enemy image" and that their class nature and sociopolitical content also differed. Nevertheless, the state of international tension itself, especially in the case of situations leading to armed conflicts, has engendered the "enemy image" and, in

turn, has been reinforced by it. This image has taken shape in the mass consciousness and has been the basis of the peculiar mentality of hostility and hatred for other countries and peoples.

In essence, all of the logic of traditional political thinking fosters the development of the peculiar mentality of "homo hostilis," the "hostile man." "Homo hostilis" views the world around him as a hostile place full of enemies. This obviously paranoid view of the world is reinforced by a double standard for the assessment of one's own actions and the actions of others. Furthermore, the consciousness of "homo hostilis" is influenced by what psychologists call cognitive dissonance, in which the "enemy image" triggers obviously irrational and indefensible actions, which are rationalized by the ascription of even more sinister intentions to the "enemy," resulting in the creation of a vicious circle of hostility.

The "enemy image" evokes an entire chain of associations and characteristics which are given a specific content depending on the social, cultural, and historical context. Nevertheless, even in different historical situations and in different societies and cultures the "face of the enemy" has always had some common features. Regardless of the specific cultural and historical context (and this is corroborated, in particular, by all of the documented information presented in American anthropologist S. Keen's comparative historical study),¹ the "enemy" is usually seen primarily as an "outsider," as a "barbarian" posing a threat to culture and civilization, as the epitome of greed and the enemy of everything sacred, as someone savagely brutal, fanatical, and capable of deception and any type of crime, as a murderer and a rapist, and as an agent of death. He also has exceptional foresight and prescience, knows exactly what he wants, and is implacable in the pursuit of his goals. The escalation of hostility has a peculiar logic of its own, leading to the complete dehumanization of the "enemy image," stripping it of all human features and a human face. This is why the "absolute enemy" is virtually faceless.

It is indicative that in many respects the "enemy image" is simply the opposite of one's own loudly declared values and ideals. And the more these values and ideals are permeated with ideological absolutism and the further they are from reality, the more tempting it is to use the "enemy image" as a scapegoat for the gap between words and actions. This kind of deformed "enemy image," portraying the adversary as a barbarian and fanatic capable of any kind of crimes, lies, and deception, justifies any kind of treatment of the adversary and submerges even the slightest doubts with regard to fairness. It not only justifies dangerous policies but even dictates the completely specific policy line of confrontation, the escalation of tension, and hostility.

The "enemy image" impedes the ability to reason and arouses and reinforces only negative emotions, feelings of fear, hatred, mistrust, revulsion, suspicion, and hostility. In this sense it could be said that not only does the

sleeping mind give birth to monsters, but also that the monsters taking the form of the "enemy image" put the mind to sleep and paralyze it. The hostile mentality also gives rise to a specific set of political morals with a well-known set of principles: "Whoever is not with us is against us," "If the enemy does not surrender, he must be destroyed," "Anything bad for the other side is good for us," etc. The "enemy image" also dictates political calculations based on the worst-case scenario, which then acquire their own momentum and become self-fulfilling prophecies. At some time in the past a policy based on these principles could produce results, but in the nuclear age the adherence to these morals and this mentality can be disastrous.

The traditional political thinking swayed by the "enemy image" is devoid of flexibility and reduces all of the complex and difficult problems in today's world to the level of the simple confrontation of "white" and "black," of "absolute good" and "absolute evil." As a result, political thinking of the traditional type shuts out anything new, anything that does not fit into a rigid ideological framework. This puts unavoidable limits on reasoning ability and restricts the search for alternatives. In essence, this kind of thinking is invariable, it is "blind," and it "shuts out" anything that deviates from the beaten track. The "enemy image" dictates the perception of any actions by the other side only from a single perspective—the perspective of hostility—and thereby strengthens other false beliefs, illusions, and stereotypes. For example, in this case any hostile behavior by the adversary simply confirms the "enemy image"; on the other hand, the adversary's attempts to reach a compromise or willingness to make concessions are also seen only as intrigues, confirming the need to deal with the enemy only from a position of strength.

The political inertia engendered by the "enemy image" leads to the assumptions and prophecies of the worst possible case and to even more—the spiralling escalation of tension and hostility. When the "enemy image" is firmly entrenched in the consciousness, it creates hostile feelings for the other side, and these are expressed in the kind of behavior appropriate for interaction with a truly deadly enemy. But ostentatiously hostile behavior is usually followed by a similar reaction, which, in turn, is then regarded as further confirmation of the presence of an "enemy." As a result, the spiralling escalation of mutual hostility gives rise to a cumulative effect. Neither side is capable of controlling the other side's behavior or its own behavior because each of the adversary's moves is regarded as a provocative act calling for a firm response. Eventually, the two sides become the victims of the very logic of confrontation and the escalation of hostility.

In general, the "enemy image" dramatically limits the possibilities for reasonable and controllable behavior. Political thinking which is influenced by this image cannot acknowledge the existence of common interests or anything else that might unite the two sides. The

emphasis is placed exclusively on differences and conflicts, and this dictates the unyielding logic of unilateral actions in opposition to the "enemy." These unilateral actions lead to countermeasures by the other side and eventually result in the same kind of dangerous escalation of the conflict.

Any thinking which is ruled by the hostile mentality is oblivious to moral criteria, especially the common standards of human morality, because it is based on egotistical group interests that are to be satisfied at someone else's expense. Any thinking which is swayed by the "enemy image" is the product of ignorance and reinforces this ignorance. The "enemy image" is one of the main obstacles standing in the way of dialogue and communication. It categorically excludes the possibility of peaceful coexistence: After all, coexistence with the "enemy" is absolutely impossible and morally indefensible. And of course, the "enemy image" does not promote restrained and civilized behavior in international relations and does preclude the observance of the proprieties in international communication and cooperation.

Finally, the "enemy image" not only poses a threat to the stability and security of international relations but also has an extremely adverse effect on life within a country. After all, the hysteria evoked by the possibility of external danger is used most often to justify a regime of secrecy and general suspicion, efforts to create a "mobilized" society and artificial national unity, "witch hunts," the suppression of dissident opinion, and the neglect of domestic problems.

We might wonder why the "enemy image" exists. Why is traditional political thinking inclined to employ this stereotype and why is it often influenced by it?

There is frequent discussion of man's natural instinct for violence and war. People also say that it is natural for the human psyche to categorize everything in the world as "familiar" or "strange" (meaning "evil" and "hostile"). But does this mean that the "enemy image" has been instilled forever in the human mind and will therefore always arouse and engender friction, conflicts, and wars?

Of course, even in the past wars inflicted colossal damage on civilization, but they never put its consistent progression in question? In the past, when hostility did not pose the threat of total annihilation, mankind could afford to live—or, more precisely, to survive—with the "enemy image." Today, however, the scales of the imminent threat and the present level of human thinking require a completely different approach to relations with other countries and peoples, a different view of them, and more accurate ideas about oneself and the surrounding world.

In all probability, it would be naive to expect the "partner image" to replace the "enemy image" in the near future. This is more likely to be a gradual displacement of the "enemy image," especially its extreme ideologized forms. It is important to remember that the "enemy image"—especially in the artificially ideologized and moralistic form so familiar to us today—is less an inherent feature of the human consciousness than a product of the deliberate manipulation of the consciousness.

The "enemy image" has always been an important part of the moral and psychological preparation of troops for war, but ever since the development of the system of mass propaganda, especially the totalitarian form which is associated with the name of Goebbels and which addresses an entire nation, the target of the moral and psychological manipulation is not only the soldier but also the entire population—one's own and the adversary's. This kind of manipulation, which is primarily accomplished through the news media, is being practiced today by the sociopolitical forces with what might be termed a direct financial interest in the escalation of international tension and the continuation of the arms race, validated by the existence of an external enemy and an external threat.

In the United States these forces consist mainly of the professional military establishment, politicians representing regions with a high concentration of military industry, and, last but not least, the military industry itself, which secures colossal profits for itself with military contracts. In essence, this is the military-industrial complex and the rightwing politicians who need the "enemy image" as an important component of the ideology of militarism and the ideological and psychological preparations for war, a component which is comparable to real military strength today in terms of its importance and expense. Professional anticommunists and anti-Soviets, including those in the academic community, are also part of this group.

But do we have a good record ourselves in this respect? Is it possible that we do not remember our own posters and political cartoons, the excesses in our rhetoric, and the oversimplification and selectivity of our approach to portrayals of the other side—all of this and many other practices that poured oil on the flames of mutual accusations, suspicion, and hostility? Even today, during the period of perestroika, our international news and journalism frequently cannot keep up with the rapid changes in our social life and social consciousness.

But there is also another relevant side to this problem. To a certain extent, some of the features of our domestic life helped to give the Soviet Union the "image of the enemy" in the American public mind. These include the absolutization of differences and contradictions between the two social systems and, consequently, the countries, the ideological rudiments of the theory of "world revolution," the tenacity of our secrecy and suspicions, and

the "monolithic" passivity of the period of stagnation. Some real events in our history also could not fail to give Americans negative feelings about the Soviet Union (from the extremes of collectivization and the Stalinist "purges" and the excesses of Zhdanov's well-known position on literature and art to the initial inclination to refer to human rights only in quotation marks). It is interesting to ask ourselves today how we might have reacted to all of this if we had observed it from outside. It is unlikely that mutual understanding was promoted by the rhetoric of our military leaders, who spoke of victory in a possible conflict with the West and then referred euphemistically to a "crushing retaliatory strike." And what about our orthodox social scientists who took refuge behind the protective armor of quotations to paint the world in exalted moralistic tones as an arena of confrontation between "good" and "evil"?

The news media warrant special discussion. Of course, each national network of mass news media has its own distinctive features, but if we take a look at the American society, we must point out not only the political and ideological tendentiousness but also some of the features of the Western media in general. Because of their emphasis on sensationalism (and, as they say in the United States, bad news is sensational), the news media are predisposed to focus attention on various scandals, problems, and unpleasant events instead of presenting a calm and balanced account of the facts. This is the first step toward the creation of a distorted image of the other side, portrayed and perceived with hostility. Furthermore, this "enemy image" is sometimes made up of bits and pieces, of stereotypes fleetingly presented in advertisements, on movie screens, in political cartoons, and so forth and having a particularly strong impact on a poorly informed and immature audience.

It goes without saying, however, that the deliberate efforts to instill feelings of hostility toward the other side in public opinion are not all it takes. When we speak of the premises and mechanisms involved in the creation of the "enemy image," it is important to also consider national cultural and historical traditions, which instill a certain attitude toward the outside world and toward other countries and peoples in the public mind, a certain view of all those who have to be dealt with in the international arena. Some of these traditions have their own way of predisposing the mind to create the "enemy image." Above all, these are the traditions of national exclusivity and ideological messianism, the inclination to regard oneself as an unconditional leader for the rest of the world and to regard all who disagree with this as enemies standing in the way of "freedom and progress." There is also the specific moralistic intolerance for any deviation from personal standards, dictating the view of the surrounding world in the absolute terms of a titanic struggle between "good" and "evil." Obviously, all countries and peoples have their own cultural and historical traditions which influence their perception of the world around them, and these are sometimes profoundly contradictory.

National cultural and historical traditions also influence the perception of one's own position in the real world and, consequently, the position of other countries and peoples. For example, some people say that countries which have been invaded by enemies frequently in their history eventually and unavoidably develop a specific form of xenophobia, suspicion, excessive secrecy, and hostility toward the rest of the world. On these same grounds, however, another statement could be made: Those whose history has made them feel completely safe and who therefore develop a superiority complex and acquire feelings of infallibility and invulnerability are most prone to hysterical reactions and the escalation of all possible fears of an external "threat" or the intrigues of "external enemies" when it becomes clear that many of their cherished ambitions and habits of the past are already groundless in light of today's realities, that their absolute security has disappeared without a trace and that the habits stemming from it are dangerously atavistic.

In a country with excessive ambitions and illusions of its own superiority and moral perfection, ideas about the "external enemy" are subject to change at a moment's notice. The term "absolute enemy" is used successively to define all those with whom problems and conflicts arise, regardless of who starts them or instigates them. In American history the term has been used to define the Indians, the Spanish, the Mexicans, the Germans, the Japanese, the Chinese, the Koreans, the Vietnamese, the Iranians, the Libyans, and, of course, the Russians, who have headed the list almost without exception in all recent decades.

To a considerable extent, the very structure of ideas about the "enemy" can differ, as well as their specific content. The roots of the other side's "hostility" can be seen, for example, in historical enmity and conflict, in geopolitical ambitions and, finally, in religious, philosophical, or ideological differences. Furthermore, it is precisely the ideological component that frequently serves as the main ferment, as something like a catalyst of hostility. American ideas about the Soviet Union and the Russians are a good example of this. Recent public opinion polls indicated, for example, that the first associations evoked in American minds by the word "Russians" include "communism," "enemies," "nuclear war," "aggression," "intervention," "world domination," etc. Another poll of American high school students revealed the following set of terms associated with the word "Russians": "Agent 007," "reds," "communists," "vodka," "sneaky," "stubborn," "nuclear war," "cold," "Siberia," etc.²

It is important to note that all of these stereotypes represent a cross section, reflecting the attitudes of the most diverse segments of the American population, people with diverging and sometimes conflicting views and positions. Obviously, ideological disagreements also reflect absolutely real events in the history of various states, and some of these are regarded as completely

unacceptable by the other side. In this respect, the ideological component of the "enemy image" can have a historical basis. It is important to realize, however, that this is the most tenacious component—even in those cases when profound changes take place in the life of the country regarded as the "enemy."

As a prerequisite for the creation and maintenance of the "enemy image," ideological disagreements acquire special significance, forming ideas about the "enemy" based on associations denying cherished ideals, values, and convictions. In these cases, the "enemy image" is endowed with features representing simple and literal denials of one's own convictions or, more precisely, the features and qualities ascribed to oneself. For example, the display of religious feeling by the majority of Americans are contrasted to "Soviet atheism"; their individualistic orientation is contrasted to "Soviet collectivism," etc. Finally, the "enemy image" is often associated with the characteristics of oneself and one's society that are particularly unpleasant or do not agree with one's ideals or self-image.

When we speak of the prerequisites and mechanisms involved in the creation of the "enemy image," we must also consider sociopsychological factors. Above all, there is the degree of awareness and the cognitive complexity of various types of political thinking.

Ignorance and a lack of awareness, for example, are usually favorable conditions for the creation of the "enemy image." It is indicative, for example, that judging by public opinion polls, the Americans who know the least about the Soviet Union and about its history, social structure, culture, and people are most inclined to have negative feelings about it. Of course, information alone is no guarantee of the eradication of the "enemy image." Sometimes the opposite is true: New information only reinforces firmly held beliefs. Balanced, objective, and complete information, however, is always an essential condition for a more accurate view of the other side.

Getting rid of the "enemy image" inevitably requires a move to a new level of political thinking. One of the reasons is that the dehumanization of the "enemy" also leads to the dehumanization of one's own self-image and ideas about oneself. A poor self-image gives rise to the temptation to define oneself by contrast to the opposite—i.e., to the "enemy." When the self-image and ideas about oneself are monolithic, oversimplified, and undifferentiated, when they are devoid of profundity and multidimensional aspects or, conversely, when they are vague and contrary to reality, there is often an inclination to define oneself according to the principle of the antithesis, using the "enemy image" for self-definition on the basis of denials: "We are not like them" (we are "free" and they are "slaves"; we are "rich" and they are "poor"; we are "honest" and they are "deceitful"; we have "peaceful intentions" and they are "hostile"; and so forth). Conversely, a rich, multidimensional, and profound self-image removes the temptation to define

oneself by contrast to the opposite, or the enemy. This is why the eradication of the unidimensional and oversimplified "enemy image" is directly related to the development of multidimensional and more profound ideas about the other side and about oneself.

There is also another important aspect of the connection between the "enemy image" and self-image. This is the widespread belief, especially among Western experts, that the "enemy image" is almost always a "mirror image"—i.e., strictly symmetrical for all potential adversaries and all countries and peoples. It has been said, for example, that the mutual perceptions of one another by virtually all peoples, especially in the case of peoples involved in real conflicts, are symmetrical, representing mirror images of one another.³ This kind of abstract and undifferentiated approach is hardly always valid from the methodological standpoint. Of course, it would be possible in principle to find people on both sides of the barricades whose ideas about the "enemy image" would be similar in many respects (for example, we have heard numerous discussions of the similarities between "Rambo" and, for instance, the "Lone Voyager"). But what is important is not formal similarity or the retention of the old way of thinking by various segments of the population or individuals in various countries, but the particular type of thinking that is dominant and has the deciding effect on policymaking in the given state and the degree to which this type of thinking prevails. After all, a political cartoon is quite a different matter from a speech by a head of state. In other words, it is important to take a differentiated approach to the particular type of thinking determining key political decisions in the given society—the old political thinking, in which the "enemy image" is always present, or the new political thinking, proceeding from the priority of general human interests over any class, political, ideological, or other goals.

Finally, it is also important to consider the fact that some unconscious psychological mechanisms which frequently perform functions of defense or compensation are also often likely to contribute to the creation of the "enemy image." The image of the external "enemy," for example, can serve as a scapegoat or a justification for one's own mistakes and miscalculations. It can also be used to divert attention from one's own problems or to project some of one's own intentions, anxieties, and frustrations onto the other side. In particular, the negative emotions and feelings of fear and anxiety evoked by the nuclear threat can be vented against the image of the "external enemy."

The close connection between the "enemy image" and the arms race warrants special consideration. First of all, the arms race itself is the source of false ideas and stereotypes. The atmosphere of militarism and preparations for war is an ideal medium for the birth and growth of the "enemy image." This is particularly true of the nuclear arms race: After all, the "absolute weapon" requires an "absolute enemy" to justify its use.

"The main element of the ideological preparation for nuclear war is the encouragement of hatred for the enemy,"⁴ wrote well-known American expert on international affairs R. Falk. And it is precisely in the nuclear age that the ideology of "crusades" and "holy wars," which is validated by the "enemy image," is particularly dangerous. Furthermore, the "enemy image" itself escalates the arms race. This creates a vicious circle in which the interaction of the arms race and the "enemy image" produces a cumulative effect. This interaction means only one thing: Progression toward disarmament is impossible without cardinal changes in the psychology of relations between states, and getting rid of the "enemy image" is unthinkable unless the arms race is curbed.

For this reason, lessening the tension in the world, getting rid of the tenacious "enemy image," eradicating morbid hostility, and broadening areas of trust between countries and peoples constitute a task comparable in importance to the task of disarmament. And this is one of the important components of the development of the new political thinking. In other words, the struggle against the nuclear threat necessarily presupposes a struggle against the ideology of hostility, against demonology, against the defamation of the adversary, and against the "enemy image." It presupposes the reorientation of the very psychology of the interrelations of countries and peoples in the world arena.

The move to the new way of thinking will be difficult in the political and psychological sense for everyone without exception, although the degree of difficulty, just as the scales and intensity of resistance, will certainly differ. The Soviet Union, just as everyone else, has no guarantees against mistakes, miscalculations, and illusions. By the same token, we are not the guaranteed possessors of the absolute truth. Furthermore, the new political thinking will not have a specific birthplace but will be the product of complex reciprocal influences. It is precisely for this reason that when we seek new approaches, we are willing to accept all of the useful elements of the ideas elaborated in the last several years by the peace movement abroad and the ideas advanced by other countries, political parties, public officials, and private individuals.

In essence, this will be the fundamental task of humanizing international relations and personalizing them, supplanting the "enemy image," making general human goals and interests the chief priority in world politics, and erasing the ideological and psychological barricades between "us" and "everyone else." Our current reading of Lenin's extremely profound and important thesis regarding the priority of the interests of social development and general human values over the interests of any particular class is of special significance in this context. "From the standpoint of the fundamental ideals of Marxism, the interests of social development are higher than the interests of the proletariat," V.I. Lenin wrote in 1899 in his work "The Draft Program of Our Party."⁵

Lenin's thoughts have new meaning today, in the nuclear-space age, requiring all of us to acquire a new perspective on the correlation of national and international objectives and of class and general human interests.

There is also an important moral and ethical side to this matter. The "enemy image" is effectively erasing the moral prohibitions against nuclear suicide. In essence, the "enemy image" exists outside morality and ethics, excludes the possibility of moral choice in principle, and personifies absolute moral "evil" at all times and in all conceivable situations. For this reason, one important way of surmounting the "enemy image" and developing the new political thinking would be the cultivation of the moral consciousness and a sense of high moral responsibility for one's own actions and for everything occurring in the world. In the new thinking, which is a moral phenomenon as well as a political one, there is no room for the "enemy image" because it proceeds from the priority of general human values.

This does not mean a return to the old maxim "Love thy neighbor" but, above all, a more accurate and more realistic perception and understanding of the other side and its real anxieties, problems, doubts, and concerns. This kind of realistic understanding (or "empathy," to use the term suggested by American psychologist R. White)⁶ could become one way of surmounting the tenacious "enemy image."

This kind of understanding will not eliminate differences or eradicate real problems and contradictions, but it will provide a new vantage point for the view of the other side and of oneself and will thereby aid in finding an acceptable compromise. This, in turn, will require, as an essential condition, the most truthful portrayals possible of the other side and of oneself, complete information, and the impermissibility of its deliberate distortion or concealment. This is something everyone will have to learn, and this is something that will require political courage and psychological preparedness. Truth in the portrayal of the other side and oneself is essentially unrelated to evaluative criteria. Evaluations reflect our attitude toward the facts, which must be true and must be reflected completely. This kind of realistic understanding is a start in surmounting the "enemy image" and surmounting dangerous tension and hostility. By virtue of this, the issue of complete and truthful information transcends the boundaries of the subject matter of human rights. It clearly has the most direct relationship to the issues of human survival and of war and peace in the nuclear age.

The realistic understanding of the other side should promote the gradual abandonment of the "enemy image" and the creation of a new and more accurate image. Here it is absolutely essential for both sides to learn more about one another. The efforts of one side are enough to create the "enemy image," but getting rid of it requires concerted action by both sides. This kind of action would aid in strengthening the atmosphere of

trust and developing cooperation in the resolution of the common problems of mankind. This would also be a move toward civilized and proper international communication.

In addition, the broader dissemination of direct information about the changes in our society might now be the main way of erasing the "enemy image" of the Soviet Union in the West. Informing the Western public of the progress in perestroika, glasnost, democratization, and the elimination of the factors which once promoted the escalation of hostility can change, and are already changing, ideas about the USSR and about the Russians.

Finally, the de-escalation of political rhetoric and the abandonment of its most absolutist and ideologized forms will be an important way of getting rid of the "enemy image." Some of our traditional ideological schemes and clichés must also be brought in line with the realities of the nuclear age and current policy. This is all the more important in view of the fact that the new political thinking is not simply a tactical line, but a general and principled approach which is certain to affect our ideology and our ideas about issues of war and peace and about the nature of the current era, the key problems of the present day, and aspects of general social and historical development.

Footnotes

1. S. Keen, "Faces of the Enemy," New York, 1986.
2. Quoted in THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 10 November 1985, p 72.
3. U. Bronfenbrenner, "The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations," in "Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War," edited by R. White, New York-London, 1986.
4. R. Lifton and R. Falk, "Indefensible Weapons. The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism," New York, 1982, p 213.
5. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 4, p 220.
6. R. White, "Fearful Warriors. A Psychological Profile of U.S.-Soviet Relations," New York-London, 1984.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

Military-Economic Integration of U.S., Canada
18030005d Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA,
IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No. 1, Jan 88 (signed to press
18 Dec 87) pp 40-48

[Article by Tamara Vladimirovna Lavrovskaya, candidate of economic sciences and senior researcher at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] Washington regards military strength as an irrefutable argument in the struggle for global hegemony. Its persistent attempts to achieve military superiority to the socialist countries are putting a strain on the U.S. economy, and this has forced American imperialism to seek ways of solving some domestic problems, particularly by relying on the combined North American economic and military potential. This was made possible by the elaboration and implementation of the concept of so-called joint continental defense, which is one of the key factors of regional integration and envisages the unlimited use of Canada's resource and military-economic potential.

North American Military Industrial Complex: Fundamental Purpose and Potential

Regional integration is securing qualitative advances in the organization and results of economic activity. In spite of the absence of an official agreement on integration, the economic interaction of the United States and Canada is being intensified and stimulated by the obvious economic advantages of this process. The consolidation of resources and the new level of international division of labor as a result of integration enhance the competitive potential of national economies, broaden the market opportunities of integration partners, and facilitate foreign expansion. By creating opportunities for advancement in the most efficient directions of international division of labor at a time of technological revolution, integration is influencing the development of productive forces directly. For example, the increased absorption potential of sales markets and the enlargement of optimal enterprise dimensions are lowering the "incorporation threshold" of new technology, which is disseminated between nations more quickly as a result of cooperative production and the merger of capital, commodity, and labor markets.

In the postwar period Canada has turned into a state with a highly developed economic complex with one of the highest per capita GDP's in the capitalist world. In 1985 this indicator was 16,500 dollars in the United States, 13,600 in Canada, 7,900 in Western Europe, and 11,000 in Japan (calculated according to official rates of currency exchange). In terms of the actual purchasing power of currency, the respective indicators were 16,500, 15,600, 11,500, and 14,300 dollars.¹ Canada's relatively high rates of economic development and its steady position among the "big seven" leading capitalist powers

are largely a result of integration with the United States—an economic giant which developed earlier and has a longer history of foreign expansion.

Almost two centuries of economic and political interaction by the United States and Canada resulted in the establishment of a regional politico-economic complex in North America with the strongest production potential in the capitalist world. It accounts for 34 percent of the population of the industrially developed capitalist countries, almost 39 percent of their combined GDP, and more than one-fourth of their foreign trade.² This is serving as an objective basis for the establishment of military-economic integration, which is playing a significant role in the formation of a unified North American center of inter-imperialist competition.

The United States is far superior to its NATO allies in terms of military strength: Its share of the military expenditures of the "big seven" leading capitalist states reached 60 percent at the beginning of the 1980's, which was 1.5 times as high as the U.S. share of the combined GDP of the "big seven" (40 percent). Canada is distinguished among the NATO countries by its relatively low indicators of military potential: In terms of proportional military expenditures in its GNP (2.2 percent in 1985), it ranks next to last in NATO (Luxembourg is in last place), and in terms of total and per capita military expenditures it ranks sixth and seventh respectively. In terms of the number of armed service personnel, Canada ranked 11th among the members of the North Atlantic bloc in 1984.

In 1984 per capita military expenditures in the United States reached 1,001 dollars, but in Canada the indicator was less than a third as high. Its total military expenditures were equivalent to only 3 percent of American expenditures in the middle of the 1980's.³ The rate of increase in these expenditures in Canada, however, is rising rapidly. For example, between 1973 and 1985, it, like the United States, increased its military allocations more than 1.5-fold (in 1975 prices),⁴ and between 1983 and 1985 Canada's real military spending increased by almost 11 percent—this was the highest indicator for all of the NATO countries but the United States.⁵ In 1986 Canada's military appropriations reached 10 billion Canadian dollars.⁶

There are fundamental differences in the economic role of government in the functioning of the military industry in the United States and Canada, and this is reflected in their different levels of government financing: In the United States almost a third (28 percent) of the federal budget is allocated for military needs, but in Canada the figure is around 9 percent on the average; at the beginning of the 1980's annual government expenditures on military R & D totaled 200 million Canadian dollars in Canada, but in the United States the figure was 150 times as high.

The asymmetry of North American military preparations is one of the factors concealing the true role of American-Canadian military cooperation in the strategy of contemporary imperialism. The pronounced disparities in the scales of U.S. and Canadian military-economic potential, combined with inadequate research into the phenomenon of North American integration, have impeded the study of its military- strategic and military-industrial aspects. The establishment of the North American center of inter-imperialist rivalry and the formation of an important element of this center, a unified military-industrial complex, have been discussed by this author in earlier works.⁷ This article is an attempt to analyze problems connected with the functioning of the North American military-industrial complex in the intensification of regional military-economic integration.

Before we discuss the nature and prospects of American-Canadian military cooperation, it seems necessary to first clarify the concept of military-economic integration and the North American military-industrial complex. The CPSU Program defines the military-industrial complex as an alliance of the monopolies producing weapons, generals, the government bureaucracy, the ideological network, and militarized science.⁸

By uniting the economic and political strength of the imperialist government with the economic potential of private business, the military-industrial complex redistributes the resources of society for the attainment of the politico-military goals of the ruling class. By creating the military-industrial complex, imperialism gave birth to a

mutant and dangerous form of production collectivization securing the possibility of centralized influence on the economy and the government stimulation of scientific and technical progress through the constant maintenance of politico-military confrontation on a global scale.

In this context, it would be best to single out the economic results of the functioning of the military-industrial complex, as its political aspects are well known and have been fully researched. Focusing on the connection between the objective tendency toward the increased collectivization of production and its centralization within the framework of military preparations allows us to move on to the disclosure of the essence of military-economic integration, representing the merger of two forms of production collectivization—intergovernmental integration and the centralization of the sphere of national production geared to military preparations. This kind of merger is stimulated, just as any other system-forming economic process, by the possibility of enhancing the effectiveness of economic—in this case, military-economic—activity on the strength of the synergistic effect of intensified social division of labor and the optimal use of all types of resources.

This means that by virtue of their economic nature, the militarization of the economy and integration can be mutually supplementary and mutually stimulating processes under specific political conditions. This is exactly what is happening in North America, where these conditions are secured by the hegemonic geopolitical orientation of American imperialism and the strength of the American military machine.

Military Spending and Armed Forces of United States and Canada in 1984

Indicators	United States	Canada
Total, in billions of dollars	237	7.2
Per capita, in dollars	1,001	288
Percentage accounted for by military spending in:		
GNP	6.4	2.1
Government spending	27.8	9.3
Total NATO spending	63.7	2.0
Armed forces personnel, in thousands	2,136	82.9
Percentage of NATO armed forces	39.6	1.5

Source: "The Military Balance 1986-1987," London, 1986, p 212; J. Clark, "Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations," Ottawa, 1985, p 26.

In addition to its military-economic components, the military-industrial complex also includes a military machine and means of political control. Consequently, a tendency toward the formation of a unified military-industrial complex can be ascertained only when military-economic integration is accompanied by the creation of the appropriate institutional structure—above all, a common military command and a mechanism of

military policy coordination. The regional integration in North America is distinguished by its largely decentralized nature, a result of the absence of a developed mechanism for the supranational regulation and coordination of intergovernmental interaction. This feature is absent from the military aspects of integration, and this is attested to by the high level of development of bilateral military contacts, securing the possibility of creating a

unified regional military-industrial complex. In contrast to the results of military-economic integration, however, its politico-military results are not so obvious. Faced by the real danger of losing national sovereignty in strategic decisionmaking, Canada is striving to retain its active role in bilateral cooperation and does not always follow in the wake of American policy.

Common class interests, however, create prerequisites for close intergovernmental cooperation in the military sphere, and a permanent basis for this was laid by a series of bilateral acts: the agreements on the continuation of U.S.-Canadian military cooperation after the war (1947), on the formation of a cabinet-level committee on current issues in joint defense (1958), on the formation of NORAD that same year, the North American Air Defense Command (the North American Aerospace Defense Command since 1981), and on joint military production and the installation of lines of communication in Canada for the American missile warning system in 1958. The establishment of the mechanism of summit-level political consultations supplemented the institutional structure and established the necessary conditions for the creation of the North American military-industrial complex—a regional system of politico-military cooperation developing on the basis of common class interests in the intensification of the military-economic integration of the United States and Canada.

This has been a far from smooth process. It has been marked, just as North American integration as a whole, by intermittent periods of regression and heightened conflict. At the same time, the establishment of a unified military-industrial complex in North America, in contrast to other regions in the capitalist world, dictates the considerable theoretical and practical value of assessments of the combined military-strategic potential of the region and the correct approach to the study of the economic and politico-military prospects for North American integration.

Economic Bases of Military Cooperation

The prime movers of North American integration are private monopolies. Even in the absence of a comprehensive system of legal contracts, they have sufficient economic incentive for the intensive penetration of the markets of integration partners. The most highly integrated spheres of the economy, however, are those in which the private monopolist mechanism of integration is combined with a developed institutional system. Along with the automotive industry, where there is an agreement on bilateral free trade, the military industry is one of the most highly integrated spheres.

In the total group of American interests there are four main factors stimulating efforts to strengthen cooperation with Canada in the military sphere. These are Canada's unique strategic position, its colossal reserves of strategic resources, the possibility of efficient division of labor in the development, production, and testing of

weapons, and the hope of attaching Canada to the U.S. military policy line through a system of joint military production and joint continental defense.

Ever since World War II, Canada's military industry has been developing in close interaction with the American military machine. After securing the transfer of the Canadian economy to military channels through their Canadian branches, American corporations organized the provision of Canada's military industry with American equipment and the production of military items according to American standards. Canada has taken part in the creation of American weapons of mass destruction. It was directly involved in the preparation and production of the first American atomic bombs. This participation took the form of shipments of uranium ore and other raw materials to the United States, the construction of a plant in British Columbia to supply the U.S. atomic industry with heavy water, and the construction of a plutonium plant in Ontario jointly with the United States. Canada later participated in the development of American chemical and bacteriological weapons.

In 1958 the military-economic integration of the United States and Canada was effectively institutionalized by the conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement on joint military production, envisaging concerted effort in military research and development, and the creation of a unified system for the production of arms and other products connected with military preparations. After obtaining equal bidding rights with American corporations for Pentagon contracts and beginning duty-free shipments of weapons and materiel to the United States, the Canadian monopolies became actively involved in unified North American military production. The creation of a strong material basis for military-economic integration was supplemented by the conclusion of more than 800 bilateral agreements and contracts on cooperation in the military sphere.

Washington justifiably regards division of labor on the continental scale as one way of reducing overhead costs in the American military industry and of expanding its resource base: Canada, which ranks second in the capitalist world after the United States in the mining of crude minerals, supplies the United States with large quantities of rare metals and other strategic materials. The fact that Canada was one of the four countries accounting for 75 percent of all uranium deposits in the capitalist world at the beginning of the 1980's is also quite significant.

The escalation of the arms race and the high profit margin on Pentagon contracts awarded in accordance with the terms of the 1958 agreement turned North American military production into the most highly integrated sphere of intraregional economic interaction, regulated with the aid of the most finely tuned, in comparison with other spheres of cooperation, organizational and administrative mechanism. As a result, in terms of

the scales and state of its institutional structure, American-Canadian cooperation in the military sphere is unparalleled in the system of capitalist world economic ties.

The Canadian military industry actually represents an extension of its American counterpart. Canada is the only country having a standing agreement with the United States on material and technical supplies for the military industry: American suppliers fill its orders just as quickly and efficiently as they fill the orders of the U.S. military establishment. An analysis of the present structure of North American military production shows that 7 of the Pentagon's top 10 contractors have branches in Canada. Around 200 firms operating in Canada earn profits from military contracts. Of the 45 largest Canadian military companies, 22 are owned by Americans, the owners of 5 are from Great Britain, 1 is Dutch, and only 17 are national firms.

The overwhelming majority of military-industrial companies specialize in the manufacture of technically complex items. It is indicative that all 12 of the largest Canadian non-chemical corporations producing high technology items work on military contracts. Director J. Van Houten of the research center of the Communist Party of Canada has pointed out the fact that when new technology is being developed in the United States, priority is assigned to large military or space projects. The commercial side of the matter is secondary: The effectiveness of the new technology is assessed primarily from the standpoint of the prospects for its military use.⁹ As a result, the high technology sector of American industry is more highly militarized than the economy as a whole; it is quite understandable that the American domination of the high technology sector of Canadian industry is intensifying the militarization of the country's economy. Companies controlled by national Canadian capital are engaged, in contrast to branches of U.S. firms, primarily in the manufacture of components and less complex military products.

The intensification of North American military-economic integration was reflected in the rapid growth of the mutual exchange of military products: The U.S. share of Canadian military purchases rose from 88 percent at the beginning of the 1970s to 95 percent in 1983, and the proportion accounted for by deliveries to the United States in the total value of military products exported by Canada rose from 61 percent to 87 percent.¹⁰

Official statistical publications do not contain any data on the scales of the production of arms and military equipment and their export to the United States. The Canadian Government stopped the publication of these data after the agreement on joint military production went into effect. Even extremely conservative estimates of only the value of contracts registered with the Canadian Commercial Corporation, however, attest to the tremendous growth of Canadian shipments of military

products to the United States: Their value rose from 481.7 million dollars to 1.5 billion dollars just between 1980 and 1983—i.e., it more than tripled. With consideration for the value of the rest of the contracts concluded directly by companies in the two countries, the indicators of Canadian participation in the activities of the North American military-industrial complex would be much higher.

The value of American military shipments to Canada always exceeds the value of shipments in the opposite direction, and Canada has a permanent deficit in this area of its trade with the United States.

In the 1980s the struggle for access to Pentagon contracts turned into a source of intergovernmental conflicts in North America. Ottawa's negative reactions to Washington's efforts to spend military budget allocations primarily within the United States became a common feature of intraregional relations. Now the Canadian Government is using the agreement on joint military production to obtain U.S. military contracts: Ottawa usually makes large Canadian purchases of American military products conditional upon the distribution of American military contracts in Canada. For example, Canada's acquisition of 138 American CF-18 fighter planes was accompanied by reciprocal orders from the producer for fighter components from Canadian firms and for the construction of a plant in Canada to manufacture parts for jet engines.

Canada is awarded more U.S. military contracts than any other capitalist country. In 1983 alone American clients and Canadian contractors signed 28 agreements stipulating that American firms producing military equipment would award contracts to Canadian companies in exchange for Canadian purchases of U.S. military products. Compensatory transactions of this kind traditionally involve military components, but they can also stipulate deliveries of civilian products. The transmission of profitable contracts to Canadian partners has aroused conflicting reactions in the United States. As a result, an amendment to the Defense Production Act, which would have secured the constant monitoring of compensatory transactions, was submitted to the Congress for discussion.

An important form of state-monopoly regulation in the Canadian economy today is the system of subsidies for Canadian military R & D, which actually represents one of the elements of government promotion of the North American military-industrial complex. It is indicative that the program for the stimulation of the military industry was the most effective of the many Canadian government programs of economic development in the 1970s. Canadian companies specializing in military production commended its results because the competitive potential of the Canadian aerospace industry was enhanced considerably.

The official position of the Canadian Government is based on the premise that the best way for Canada to keep in step with scientific and technical progress is participation in long-range U.S. programs, which was demonstrated by the success in the development of the so-called "space arm" (Canadarm)—a remote-control manipulator installed on the space shuttle vehicles. The manipulators were sold to NASA without any kind of limitations on the Canadian side, despite the fact that one-third of all the shuttle flights were to be made for purely military purposes. The high operational qualities Canadarm demonstrated during Pentagon experiments made its producer, Spar Aerospace, a Canadian company, an important contractor of the U.S. military establishment. In 1984 this company was awarded another contract for the sum of 85.8 million dollars for the development and delivery to the United States of three sets of infrared target tracking devices, a project conducted as part of a joint American-Canadian project financed by the U.S. Navy and the Canadian Department of National Defense. The infrared devices, just as the remote manipulator, are intended to service objects in space, particularly during the construction of orbiting space stations in the future. The participation of Canadian high technology companies in American space arms programs presupposes Canada's indirect participation in the militarization of space.

The activity of Spar Aerospace is far from the only example of this kind. All North American military production is interrelated by the functioning of a single administrative center, considerations of economic effectiveness, and the political "attachment" of the contractor-country to the client-country. Therefore, the final results of American military production cannot be separated from the results of Canadian production, just as the role of American military business cannot be separated from its Canadian counterpart.

Canadian Communists have assessed the situation objectively, stressing that "Canada will play a key role in the SDI."¹¹ The intensive intraregional cooperation in the sphere of military production and supply operations will make the United States and Canada mutually responsible for the economic, political, and military consequences of the activities of the North American military-industrial complex.

The goals pursued by the United States and Canada in the process of military-economic integration are different in many respects. Whereas for Canada the Pentagon's military contracts are playing an important role in sustaining economic activity in military and related civilian sectors of the economy and the integrated military-industrial complex is stimulating the transmission of the latest technology, for the United States the intensification of intraregional military cooperation will not only secure the advantages of division of labor and the use of Canadian resources but also presupposes Canada's dependence on the American military machine.

Integration and Issues of War and Peace

The failure of the U.S. aggression in Vietnam and the erosion of American influence in the late 1960s and early 1970s signalled the need to reorder Canada's politico-military priorities. The main motive was the desire to dissociate Canada from discredited U.S. policies and the malfunctioning U.S. economic machine. Several actions were taken to reduce Canada's military potential: The Trudeau government cut the contingent of Canadian troops in Western Europe in half and reduced budget allocations for military purposes. The elimination of the Beaumark and Honest John systems and the replacement of carrier aircraft with conventional vehicles rid Canada of nuclear weapons. In essence, the Canadian Government decided that giving the United States a chance to move its forward positions to Canadian territory was a sufficient contribution to North American defense. As P. Trudeau said in 1984, "we are contributing a truly invaluable element to NORAD, namely the air space over our vast territory. The United States can plan its own defense in the knowledge that the territory of a loyal ally stretches 4,000 kilometers to the north."

As soon as B. Mulroney took office, he announced his government's intention to "fulfill all of its NATO obligations" and establish "closer relations with the United States" in the military sphere.¹² Regarding the annual military allocations of 7-8 billion dollars as inadequate, the Conservative government decided to raise the level of spending, and not by the 3 percent a year stipulated in the NATO decision, but by 6 percent.¹³ The expensive program for the re-equipping of the armed forces which began to be carried out in Canada in the middle of the 1980s presupposes the continued reinforcement of the Canadian military industry and its export potential: Quantitative changes will be accompanied by serious qualitative changes, namely the move to the independent development of finished weapons systems.

An analysis of the evolution of intraregional cooperation testifies that the technical improvement of weapons is influencing the aspects of U.S. military strategy which are connected with U.S. interrelations with Canada. In the 1950's American strategy was based on the idea of a massive nuclear attack by bomber aviation, and in connection with this the Pentagon assigned Canada the functions of detection and interception. In the 1960s missile carrying submarines capable of delivering strikes in virtually any direction began to play an important role in U.S. military strategy. This diminished Canada's significance in U.S. defense.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s the United States revised its military doctrine, making it more diversified. On the one hand, it began developing such offensive weapons as cruise missiles, MX missiles, the Trident system, and the Stealth bombers, and Litton Systems, Spar Aerospace, and other Canadian companies took an active part in their production. At the same time, because Canada was taking an active part in the development of American space technology within the frame-

work of existing agreements and existing economic, scientific, and technical ties, it had to be included in the work on the "Strategic Defense Initiative." The U.S.-Canadian cooperation on the SDI was predetermined by the fact that, as the Canadians admit, their country is "completely integrated into U.S. strategic planning and defense"¹⁴ and by its leading position in the world trade in aerospace technology. This cooperation corresponds to the priorities of Canadian subcontractors.

A new approach to continental defense was elaborated in the joint American-Canadian military research project "Strategic Defense Architecture-2000" (SDA-2000). The first stage of the project concerned defense against bombers and cruise missiles launched from them. The problems of combating ballistic missiles were researched during the second stage of the project. This clearly points up the direct connection between SDA-2000 and the SDI. Canada's role in American plans has been augmented sharply once again: It is to secure the interception of cruise missiles and bombers at the maximum distance from U.S. territory—i.e., actually over the territory and waters of Canada. When R. Reagan visited Canada in March 1985, an agreement was concluded on the modernization of the early warning radar system in the Canadian Arctic.

Military cooperation is stimulating other spheres of intraregional interaction, including trade.

Through its active integration into the structure of the North American military-industrial complex, Canada is becoming a direct accessory to the attainment of U.S. military-strategic goals. The underlying motives of its contribution to American military preparations are of little importance because its participation in the creation of the material and technical base of U.S. military-strategic potential is producing tangible results and is supplementing the military efforts of American imperialism.

The United States' regional ambitions, stemming from its desire for a continental alliance and the creation of an effective counterbalance to other centers of competition, will continue to exist in the foreseeable future, regardless of the concrete results of bilateral economic and political interaction. The integration of the United States and Canada will contribute to the growth of the economic and military-strategic potential of the region and the establishment of a unified North American power center. This is the reason for its growing influence on the nature and results of inter-imperialist rivalry and its transformation into one of the objective bases on which American imperialism can rely in the pursuit of its foreign policy goals.

Footnotes

1. Calculated according to data in "OECD. Main Economic Indicators," Paris, January 1987, pp 172-173.

2. Ibid., pp 29, 172-173.

3. Calculated according to data in "The Military Balance 1986-1987," London, 1986, p 212.

4. Ibid., p 234.

5. THE TORONTO STAR, 2 March 1986.

6. THE FINANCIAL POST, 1 December 1986.

7. "Sovremennyy monopolisticheskiy kapitalizm. Avstraliya i Kanada" [Contemporary Monopolist Capitalism. Australia and Canada], Moscow, 1984, p 217; MEMO, 1982, No 8, pp 42-55.

8. "Materialy XXV!I syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 133.

9. COMMUNIST VIEWPOINT, June 1985, pp 22-24.

10. THE FINANCIAL POST, 12 December 1984.

11. CANADIAN TRIBUNE, 9 December 1985.

12. Quoted in PRAVDA, 10 December 1984.

13. INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, 1985, vol 18, No 3, p 341.

14. GAZETTE, 22 November 1986.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

8588

Presidential Election Year

18030005e Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 18 Dec 87) pp 49-54

[Article by V.S. Anichkina]

[Text] In the United States "elections are important," Theodore White wrote in his book "America in Search of Itself" (1982), the last book in his series "The Making of the President."¹ "They give Americans not only their chief sense of participating in their government but, more importantly, a sense of control."

Campaigns for election to offices at all levels of government are held in the United States every 2 years. And every other time—i.e., every 4 years—a president is elected in the United States.

A new president will be elected in 1988. Ronald Reagan will finish his second term in the White House in January 1989 and is prohibited by American law from running for re-election to this office again. This is

compounding the agitation in the two parties whose representatives have occupied the White House by turns for more than a hundred years²—in the Democratic Party (in the last 20 years only one Democrat has been the master of the White House, and only for one term—J. Carter from 1977 to January 1981) and in the Republican Party (during the last presidential campaign, in 1984, Reagan was the party's indisputable favorite and no other Republican dared to challenge him in earnest).

In the United States the president is the chief executive, effectively controlling the nation's foreign and military policy, including the conclusion of treaties (their ratification requires the approval of two-thirds of the senators); he is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and makes appointments to all administrative federal positions (with the subsequent approval of the most important appointments by the Senate). The president can veto congressional legislation (this veto can then be overridden by two-thirds of the members of each house), can grant pardons, can convene special sessions of Congress, and can exercise many other important powers. Therefore, the American Constitution endowed the president of the United States with tremendous power, more than in any other great nation.

This is why the presidential elections stir up political passions, agitate broad segments of the American public, and arouse the high sense of political participation mentioned by T. White. And the fact that far from all voters go to the polls on election day—on 8 November this year—does not mean that the Americans are passive or do not care about this event: Their direct participation in the presidential elections begins long before election day—with participation in the "primaries,"³ where the support for various candidates is determined in different parties and states. Primaries will be held in late January and in February 1988 in Hawaii, Michigan, Iowa, New Hampshire, Minnesota, South Dakota, and Maine; they will be held simultaneously in 20 states (including 14 southern ones) on 8 March. This will conclude the first stage of the primaries, during which a third of the party convention delegates will be elected, and which could reveal the identity of the leader in one or both parties in this presidential "race" (this sports term is widely used in the United States to describe the lengthy struggle for the presidential nomination).

At the end of 1987 there were many contenders in both parties, but none (with the possible exception of Vice-President George Bush) could be called the obvious leader yet. Above all, this was true of the Democrats. There were six of them then. What is interesting is that two new contenders entered the race in the last 6 months, but the total number actually decreased instead of increasing (there were seven of them in the middle of 1987), because Hart and Biden had to withdraw from the race. On 16 December, however, Hart re-entered the race, stating that he had decided to fight for the nomination. This brought the number of Democratic candidates back up to seven.

Senator J. Biden from Delaware withdrew from the race quite suddenly, and just at the time when national television and the "big press" were focusing attention on him as the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee during the discussion of Justice Bork's appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court (the Senate rejected Reagan's appointee). After one of Biden's speeches, he was accused of plagiarizing the speeches of English Labor Party leader Kinnock; the senator responded by accusing the news media of treating him with hostility and withdrew from the race. It was later learned that the idea of plagiarism was suggested to the press and television by J. Sasso, the campaign manager of Governor M. Dukakis of Massachusetts, who is also campaigning for the presidency. Dukakis said that he had not known anything about Sasso's actions and then accepted Sasso's resignation.

In addition to Hart and Biden, five leading Democratic contenders became, as *TIME* magazine put it, "naysayers." These were Senator S. Nunn from Georgia, Governor R. Celeste of Ohio, Governor M. Cuomo of New York, and two politicians from Arkansas—Senator D. Bumpers and Governor W. Clinton. A short time later Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder from Colorado also announced her refusal to seek the nomination.

But there is this nuance to the presidential campaigns: Some contenders who have good chances and considerable influence but do not have enough money or energy to participate in the long marathon race for the presidency could hope to become their party's candidate in the event of a "deadlock" at the national convention—i.e., in the event that no officially campaigning candidate can win the support of the majority. In particular, some American newsmen have suggested that M. Cuomo is taking this kind of position and are citing his intensive trips abroad in fall 1987 as evidence.

According to *WASHINGTON POST* correspondent P. Taylor, all of the Democratic candidates "were practically neck and neck in the race" by fall 1987, and there was "still no obvious leader, no outstanding personality, and no clear campaign issue or direction.... They are all around the same age and have the same outlook and disposition.... They are ready to grasp at anything that might distinguish them from all the rest."

Senator Paul Simon from Illinois is trying to stand out from the rest by focusing on need for better health care; he has a detailed plan for the creation of a government-financed system of medical care for the elderly (and these, we should note, constitute the largest group of voters actively participating in elections; half of the people who voted for Reagan in 1984 were 65 and older). Although Simon is not well known on the national level, he is quite popular in his neighboring state of Iowa and is supported by labor unions there (incidentally, it was Illinois that gave the United States President Abraham Lincoln).

Another possible Democratic candidate is former Governor of Arizona Bruce Babbitt (Arizona was once represented in the Senate by famous "hawk" Barry Goldwater, who was the Republican presidential candidate in 1964 but lost the election to Democrat Lyndon Johnson; in the more than 200 years of the presidency, not one president has come from Arizona). Babbitt advocates a 5-percent tax on consumption and wants federal benefits to be distributed strictly according to need instead of being given automatically to all those eligible.

Of course, Jesse Jackson does not have make any special effort to stand out from the rest of the Democratic candidates.⁴ Ever since he officially entered the race in October 1987, he has been waging an energetic campaign. Observers have noted that most of his supporters are in the south (furthermore, Jackson has the highest expectations for the young black vote; according to the Bureau of the Census, the percentage of black Americans between the ages of 18 and 24 who voted in the 1986 elections was higher than the figure for white Americans of the same age group). Nevertheless, Jackson is also preparing for battles in Iowa (which he did not do in the 1984 campaign) and in New Hampshire, where the first of the 1988 primaries will be held on 16 February.

Michael Dukakis is combining his duties as governor of Massachusetts (the 2d and 6th presidents of the United States, John Adams and John Quincy Adams, and the 35th, John Kennedy, came from Massachusetts; besides them, there was one other president—Calvin Coolidge) with the role of a "runner" in the presidential race, without missing a single opportunity to address voters in other states. His main topics are ethnic issues and the need for a balanced economy (as we have already pointed out,⁵ he makes references in these speeches to his experience in Massachusetts, where he was able to get rid of the deficit in the state budget). He is quite well known in the neighboring state of New Hampshire and in other New England states, in the central northeastern states, and in nearby Iowa (a central northwestern state). It is not clear, however, what will happen when the campaign reaches the south.

In the south the Democrat with the best chances at this time is Senator Albert Gore from Tennessee, the only representative of the southern states (this state has not

played as important a role in the history of the presidency as, for instance, Arizona; it has given the United States three presidents, but it is true that the latest of these, Andrew Johnson, occupied the White House more than 100 years ago—from 1865 to 1869).

Finally, the last Democratic candidate, Congressman R. Gephardt from Missouri (this state "presented" the United States with President H. Truman, who is famous for derailing Soviet-American cooperation and starting the "cold war"). Gephardt is focusing his campaign on the huge deficit in U.S. foreign trade. Judging by the polls, he can expect support in the Midwest.

With the exception of J. Jackson, who has had experience running in the presidential race, the Democratic candidates are new faces and are not known to all Americans. This is probably why all of them rushed to Vermont, to participate in debates on a variety of issues, to address various social gatherings, to attend fairs, to attract attention, and to win support. This is where the first test of strength is held and, what is most important, it is here and, a short time later, in New Hampshire that the extensive media coverage of the primaries will give the candidates national exposure.

Just before the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles was signed, the views of the participants in the "race" on this and other aspects of arms control naturally aroused interest. "The Democratic candidates are entirely in favor of the projected treaty," a NEW YORK TIMES editorial said on 30 September 1987. THE WASHINGTON POST remarked that "three have called the prevention of nuclear war the chief aim of U.S. foreign policy and issued an earnest appeal for vigorous talks with the Soviet Union." The LOS ANGELES TIMES stressed that "all of the Democrats opposed the creation of a space-based antimissile system," but singled out Gore as being "closer to the administration's position than his party colleagues." Various peace organizations in the United States have also evaluated the positions of the candidates (one of these evaluations is presented in the table).

Candidates' Positions on Arms Control Issues

Candidates	Total nuclear test ban	Observance of SALT I treaty	Freeze on missile flight tests ^a	Traditional interpretation of ABM Treaty ^{a*}	Ban on antisatellite weapons	Deployment of MX	Early deployment of Star Wars system
Democrats							
Babbitt	for	for	for	for	for	against	against
Dukakis	for	for	for	for	for	against	against
Gephardt	for	for	for	for	for	against	against
Gore	for	for	against	for	for	for	against
Jackson	for	for	for	for	for	against	against

Candidates' Positions on Arms Control Issues

Candidates	Total nuclear test ban	Observance of SALT I treaty	Freeze on missile flight tests*	Traditional interpretation of ABM Treaty**	Ban on antisatellite weapons	Deployment of MX	Early deployment of Star Wars system
Simon	for	for	for	for	for	against	against
Republicans							
Bush	against	—(no position)	against	against	—	for	—
Dole	against	against	against	against	against	for-	for
DuPont	against	—	against	—	—	—	for
Haig	—	—	—	—	against	for	against
Kemp	against	against	against	against	against	for-	for
Robertson	—	—	—	—	—	—	for

* Proposal aimed against further improvement of nuclear weapon delivery systems by both sides.

** Interpretation approved by sides when ABM Treaty was signed and observed for 15 years, namely the prohibition of tests of antimissile weapons systems in outer space.

Source: "Council for a Livable World Education Fund and Freeze Voter Education Fund. Nuclear Arms Control and the 1988 Presidential Candidates," October 1987, pp 6-7.

The Republicans, in the words of THE NEW YORK TIMES, are "deeply suspicious of arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.... Pierre DuPont, Alexander Haig, Congressman Jack Kemp, and television evangelist Pat Robertson have clearly expressed their dissatisfaction with the upcoming talks on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe and Asia. Senator Bob Dole is in no hurry to state his opinion.... Only Vice-President G. Bush supports the treaty."

Bush's position in the campaign, which he entered officially last October, is directly related to all of the current administration's recent actions. In the beginning it seemed that the scandal over the arms sales to Iran and the diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan contras would cause irreparable damage. Although he was leading in the polls, doubts about his chances were expressed in the press—there were references to the "Iran-Contra" affair and allusions to historical precedents (ever since M. Van Buren, the vice-president in Andrew Jackson's second administration, won the next election in 1836, no vice-president has been able to do the same—to announce his candidacy, become the official party nominee, and win the election—although many have tried). And there is also something else.

As NEWSWEEK correspondent T. Morgenthau remarked on 19 October 1987, although G. Bush is "an experienced, stable, and decent politician with excellent credentials, more than enough money (according to estimates, he has collected more campaign contributions than all other candidates—over 13 million dollars), a large and well-organized staff, and an obvious advantage

in early public opinion polls...., it is with a growing sense of disillusionment that the Republican conservative ranks are seeking a successor to Reagan who will maintain Republican control of the White House and lead the conservative movement in the 1990's. They have not found their hero yet." Bush's resolute support of the Soviet-American treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles, however, has strengthened his position considerably. Many party officials have expressed support for Bush's candidacy; the majority of Republican representatives from New York support Bush (rather than Congressman J. Kemp from their own state). Nevertheless, it is still too early to say that Bush can confidently expect to be nominated at the Republican convention. Conservative party officials are the ringleaders at the convention and they still do not see Bush as their candidate.

It appears that the most fierce battles will be fought in connection with the unacceptability of Bush's views on several major issues to conservative Republicans. The right wing and the lobbyists for the military-industrial complex will make a concerted effort to prevent the ratification of the Soviet-American treaty. It is possible that their statements against the treaty will take the form of attacks on Bush and all others who support the treaty and arguments against the need for advancement in this matter, which will certainly be a major issue in the presidential campaign.

But even J. Kemp, an obvious spokesman for the conservatives, has been unable to gain much support to date. Although P. Robertson gave up his television sermons for the campaign and even put aside his duties as pastor of his church in Virginia Beach, he is still supported

mainly by evangelists. Haig's candidacy seems "unrealistic" to the majority of Republican politicians. This is also true of P. DuPont's candidacy.

Senator Dole, who follows Bush in the polls, although he is quite far behind him, was the last to enter the race (on 9 November). His official announcement of this was preceded by careful preparations: He participated in televised debates, and his wife, Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole, resigned office to support her husband and help him with his campaign. He is virtually the only candidate who made serious preparations for the primaries in Hawaii (on 27 January). Dole, along with Bush, is associated closely with the activities of the Reagan Administration, although he might be in a slightly more advantageous position. After all, senators, including Republicans, have not always adhered obediently to President Reagan's line (in contrast to the vice president, whose position on the American hierarchical ladder is always subordinate). For example, during the discussion of the draft budget for fiscal year 1988, in which the administration requested military appropriations exceeding the projected rate of inflation by 3 percent, Dole did not support this request.

Incidentally, no candidate is advocating higher military spending, not even Kemp (he feels that the present level of spending should be maintained). This reflects the general mood of the country—a new mood, distinct from the prevailing mood of the two preceding presidential campaigns. "At a time of 200-billion-dollar deficits," T. Reid remarked in THE WASHINGTON POST, "as the polls indicate, the national consensus on higher military spending has evaporated."

It is true that the huge budget deficit and the huge federal debt require immediate solutions. In the opinion of several experts and journalists, one solution is the reduction of military spending. The same Reid cited these figures in his article: During Reagan's years in the White House there has been an increase of more than 100 percent in the defense budget—from 136 billion dollars in fiscal year 1981 to 289.2 billion in 1987, but the rate of inflation in those years, he stressed, was comparatively low.

Therefore, the United States has entered a presidential election year. American voters must state their choice. Now they are listening carefully to what each candidate promises them "if he becomes president."

Footnotes

1. For chapters from this book, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1985, Nos 1, 2.

2. The last president of the United States from another party, the Whigs, was Millard Fillmore in 1850-1853.

3. The term "primaries" is used in the United States to refer either to a state party conference convened specifically for the purpose of supporting a particular candidate or a meeting of voters from this party for the same purpose, or to the so-called primary elections, in which state electors choose "their" candidates by means of direct elections (the law in some states envisages direct elections not for a particular politician, but for delegates to the party national conventions, where they will support a specific candidate; incidentally, this obligation has more moral than legal force).

4. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1985, No 2, p 66.

5. Ibid., 1987, No 7, pp 77-78.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

8588

Short Book Reviews

18030005f Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 18 Dec 87) pp 111-112

[Reviews by V.Yu. Presnyakov of book "SSSR-SShA i Kanada: problemy torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy" [USSR-United States and Canada: Problems in Trade and Economic Relations], edited by A.V. Anikin and A.Z. Astapovich, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1987, 328 pages; by I.L. Abalkina of book "Mirovoy okean: ekonomika i politika. Mezhdunarodnyye problemy osvoyeniya" [World Ocean: Economics and Politics. International Development Problems], edited by Ye.M. Primakova, Moscow, Mysl, 1986, 621 pages; and by A.V. Frolov of book "Pokroviteli agressii. Blizhniy Vostok v svete burzhuaiznoy istoriografii" [Sponsors of Aggression. The Middle East as Seen by Bourgeois Historians] by S.I. Appatov and P.Ya. Raynov, Kiev-Odessa, Vishcha shkola, 1986, 164 pages]

[Text]

USSR-United States and Canada

The authors' analysis led to several general conclusions providing a basis for the assessment of the current state of the three countries' relations and their possible prospects.

In their opinion, a new stage of Soviet-American economic relations began at the turn of the decade. The American administration's efforts to curb and suspend East-West contacts were not an incidental or transitory reversal in U.S. foreign policy. They were a reaction to the changing role of the United States in world affairs and to its loss of several of its dominant positions. Nevertheless, despite the negligible development of commercial contacts between the Soviet Union and the

United States, which accounted for just over 1 percent of the USSR's foreign trade in 1986, the authors believe that there is a real possibility of stronger Soviet-American cooperation in the future in view of the major initiatives our country has advanced in recent years.

The authors analyze ways of eliminating the disparities in trade in the United States' favor and reveal the causes of the lack of progress in the structure of Soviet exports to the American market. They note that the current reorganization of the USSR's foreign economic relations will create fundamentally new opportunities to solve existing problems, including the possibility of establishing joint enterprises and developing various forms of cooperative production.

The informative chapters on Soviet-Canadian trade and economic relations will also arouse the reader's interest, although it is true that these still account for only around 0.5 percent of our country's trade. In spite of Canada's strong economic dependence on the United States and their geographic proximity, the USSR's economic relations with Canada are similar in many respects to Soviet-West European relations. This is reflected specifically in the structure of Soviet exports to Canada. The authors' detailed analysis of the activities of Soviet-Canadian joint stock companies is of particular interest (pp 282-288). They have accumulated considerable positive experience and have given us a better understanding of the complex and voluminous North American market.

World Ocean

The economic, political, and legal aspects of the use of the world ocean are the subject of this latest study of contemporary global problems by the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The issues of world ocean development have acquired universal significance as a result of an entire group of interrelated factors. The most significant ones listed by the authors include the possible use of the world ocean for the resolution of major human problems—the raw material, energy, and food crises. It is more important today than ever before to take an ecologically balanced approach to the use of the world ocean. This is the largest transport system, the object of intensive research in various fields, and, last but not least, a sphere of military activity. This is why international security in general will depend to a considerable extent on the prospects for the peaceful use of the world ocean. All of these different areas are analyzed in the work through the prism of the maritime policies of various groups of countries and the search for suitable means of international regulation of world ocean activity. The authors naturally discuss the position of the United States, which is trying to take unilateral action, sometimes in opposition to the world community (for example, it refused to sign the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea), and is using force to settle maritime conflicts and to seize "economic territories" of the world

ocean. In addition to all of this, the authors clearly show that the international efforts in maritime activity are giving mankind a unique opportunity to prove that the world ocean not only divides continents but also brings the countries and peoples of the entire planet closer together.

Sponsors of Aggression

The Ukrainian authors of this study demonstrate quite thoroughly and logically that the arrival of the Reagan Administration in the White House marked the beginning of much more pronounced belligerence in American policy in the Middle East. This evolution reflected a deep-seated struggle between various ideological currents within the U.S. ruling class over methods of dominating the Middle East.

The authors examine the basic concepts of the United States' Middle East policy and the prevailing views of each specific period in history. They discuss American literature dealing with the Middle East at length. In no sense can their book be called bibliographic, however; it would be more correct to call it a history of politics through bibliography. The authors draw several important conclusions. In particular, they make the quite accurate observation that "the extreme conservatives with the strongest influence on the current administration's policies regard peaceful settlement as an auxiliary diplomatic maneuver to establish the political, economic, and military hegemony of the United States in the region and to weaken the influence of the USSR and revolutionary democratic forces in the Middle East." The authors cogently demonstrate how domestic political factors have played such an important role in the evolution of the views of American bourgeois scholars. These factors combine to make up a "home environment" with serious influence on the elaboration of concepts of Washington policy in the region and the struggle of ideas in the political and historical sciences in the United States.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

8588

Canadian-Soviet Conference on Disarmament, Regional Conflicts

18030005g Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 18 Dec 87) pp 122-123

[Report by Ye.I. on Soviet-Canadian conference in Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies at end of 1987: "First Meeting of Two Institutes"]

[Text] The Soviet-Canadian conference on the prevention of nuclear war and on disarmament and regional conflicts, held at the end of last year in the Institute of

U.S. and Canadian Studies (ISKAN) of the USSR Academy of Sciences, marked the beginning of a program of bilateral cooperation between the ISKAN and the Canadian Institute of Peace and International Security (CIPIS).¹ During the Canadian delegation's visit, the institutes signed an agreement on academic exchanges which should become an important channel for the expansion of Soviet/Canadian scientific contacts.

After Academician G.A. Arbatov, director of ISKAN, had called the conference to order, he noted the profound changes in Soviet society, especially in the economy, and the special importance of teaching the Soviet people modern methods of economic management. In reference to the international aspects of the perestroika, G.A. Arbatov advocated mutually acceptable approaches to the resolution of international problems and the development of the new political thinking.

Questions connected with the limitation of space and nuclear arms, the verification of disarmament agreements, nuclear non-proliferation, and the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles were discussed at the conference. The Soviet and Canadian sides agreed that the conclusion of the Soviet-American agreement on the elimination of these two classes of missiles will be of great politico-military significance and will aid in creating an atmosphere of trust in international relations. Speakers noted that agreements of this kind will pave the way for agreements on space and strategic arms reduction.

Soviet speakers at the conference (A.A. Vasilyev, M.A. Milshteyn, L.S. Semeyko, and others) explained the fundamentals of the new Soviet approach to the problem of verifying the observance of disarmament agreements. They stressed that this issue was a stumbling-block in disarmament talks for many years. The West tried to put all of the blame on the Soviet Union by accusing it of taking an unyielding stance on questions of verification. Now that the USSR is insisting on the use of all forms and methods of verification, including on-site inspections, the United States is going back on its word and renouncing its earlier demands.

The head of the Canadian delegation, J. Pearson, noted the importance of Soviet initiatives on the issue of the verification of disarmament agreements. In his opinion, there is a real possibility that Soviet-American agreements in addition to the one on medium- and shorter-range missiles will be concluded in the sphere of disarmament. He stressed that the future of Soviet-Canadian relations, the present state of which seems quite good to him, will depend largely on the resolution of disarmament issues.

Director T. Colton of the University of Toronto Institute of Russian and East European Area Studies believes that the reduction of conventional arms will be the key issue in disarmament talks after the conclusion of the agreement to eliminate the two classes of missiles. In his

opinion, the principles of openness and glasnost have begun to influence the foreign policy of the USSR, but this cannot be said of Soviet defense policy. He said that the international public is still not completely aware of all of the changes in the Soviet foreign policy line. This will take time. E. Regehr, Conrad Grebel College science director and the author of "Industry of Death: Canada's Military Industry," "Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race," and other well-known books, agreed with the Soviet scientists' statements about the exceptional danger of the SDI. On the other hand, he believes that an agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive arms could be concluded without the reduction of space arms and the United States' observance of the ABM Treaty. In his opinion, the agreement on strategic arms reduction will make the creation of an antimissile system with space-based elements unnecessary.

Regional conflicts, economic security, and human rights were also discussed at the conference. Soviet speakers (V.V. Zhurkin, G.A. Trofimenko, and S.P. Fedorenko) stressed the need to surmount the common opinion that any local war is the result of rivalry between the great powers and noted the importance of seeking new means and methods of settling these conflicts. Professor J. Holmes, the former assistant secretary of state for external affairs who is now a consultant to Canada's Institute of International Relations and the author of several basic works on Canadian foreign policy, discussed the role of the United Nations in international affairs. In his opinion, the United Nations is of special significance to small and medium-sized states because it aids them in the better protection of their own interests and in forming coalitions within the UN framework with countries adhering to similar positions. This is why the Canadian Government has always assigned great significance to the activity of the United Nations and other international institutions. In connection with the frequent U.S. violations of Canadian territorial waters, Ottawa is extremely interested in the passage of new legislation on the law of the sea and is encouraging other countries to support it. Holmes also noted that UN Security Council Resolution 598 has a good chance of stabilizing the situation in the Persian Gulf. The Canadian researcher also criticized the United Nations, however, for being more concerned with seeking a consensus than with making constructive decisions.

The influence of the state of East-West relations on regional conflicts was discussed by another member of the Canadian delegation, R. Matthews, political science professor from the University of Toronto and editor of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL.

International trade, the debts of the developing countries, environmental protection, the food crisis, and human rights were discussed in reports by N.P. Shmelev, L.A. Bagramov, V.I. Sokolov, S.V. Gorbunov, and I.A. Geyevskiy. As the report by Executive Director B. Wood of the Canadian Institute of North-South Relations indicated, all aspects of economic security are of primary

importance to Canada, which is one of the largest trading nations in the world. After noting that three-fourths of Canada's exports are sent to the United States, Wood discussed the prospect of another regional structure—a Canadian-American free trade zone.

Summing up the results of the conference, J. Pearson said that it had performed its main function by allowing Soviet and Canadian researchers to exchange views on key international issues. "I am certain," he stressed, "that these contacts will be continued and I even anticipate joint Soviet-Canadian research projects."

Footnotes

1. The CIPIS is a governmental institute founded in 1984. It plays an important role in Canadian foreign and military policymaking (the secretary of state for external affairs reports its activities to the federal Parliament annually). It has its own press organ, PEACE AND SECURITY. The directors of the institute include prominent politicians and public spokesmen from Canada and other countries, diplomats, and scholars. Its chairman is former Canadian representative to the United Nations W. Barton. Its executive director, J. Pearson, is a professional diplomat who has worked for the Canadian Department of External Affairs since 1952. In 1978 he was appointed special ambassador for arms control and from 1980 to 1983 he was Canada's ambassador to the USSR. He headed the Canadian delegation at the conference in ISKAN.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988.

8588

Articles Not Translated from SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 1, January 1988

18030005h Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 18 Dec 87) pp 1-2

United States and Uruguay GATT Round (I.Ye. Artemyev) pp 20-28

Winter Olympics: Money and Sports (S.I. Guskov) . pp 54-60

Labor Resources in Machine Building (A.R. Daniyelov) pp 61-67

Wassily Leontief on Soviet Economy (V.M. Kudrov) . pp 68-70

American Mass Culture for Export (G.K. Ashin) pp 71-79

America's Health in the Balance (Howard Hiatt) pp 80-88

U.S. Steel Industry Restores Its Competitive Potential (A.F. Myrtsyomov) pp 89-96

SDI: Inconsistent with Logic (D.V. Klimov and S.K. Oznobishchev) pp 97-100

Review of "The Triumph of Politics. How the Reagan Revolution Failed" by David A. Stockman (S.M. Samuylov) pp 101-103

Review of "Innovation: The Attackers' Advantage" by Richard N. Foster (M.M. Ivanov) pp 104-106

Review of "Nuclear Ethics" by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (M.S. Chetverikova) pp 106-108

Review of "The Special Relationship. Anglo-American Relations Since 1945," edited by Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (M.Yu. Bogdanov) pp 108-111

East North Central States (L.V. Smirnyagin) ... pp 113-115

Wisconsin (L.V. Smirnyagin) pp 115-121

What Happened at the Stock Exchange? (V.T. Musatov) pp 124-127

8588

Publication Data

18030005i Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 18 Dec 87)

English title: USA; ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

Russian title: SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA

Editor: V.M. Berezhkov

Publishing house: Izdatelstvo Nauka

Place of publication: Moscow

Date of publication: January 1988

Signed to press: 18 December 1987

Copies: 28,500

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988

8588

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

JULY 27 1988